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This thesis presents three chapters that empirically investigate role of
banks on wage and wealth gaps between heterogeneous households using
DSGE models.
The first chapter analyses the role of an endogenous human capital accu-
mulation channel and solvent banks (demand side of the credit market only)
on wage gap. We find that the TFP shock reduces wage and income gaps,
whereas preferences or financial shocks increase wage and welfare gaps. The
welfare gap will be reduced under a human capital shock, whereas wage gap
will only be reduced in the short-run. Our findings also suggest that the pres-
ence of lending facilities mitigates the propagation mechanism of the shocks
to wage and welfare gaps, whereas the human capital accumulation channel
mainly improves the welfare of borrowers and significantly affects wage and
wealth gaps. Robustness checks show that our key results remain valid.
The second chapter examines wage and wealth gaps under the presence
of an imperfect banking competition, as it allows to study both supply and
demand sides of the credit market. The findings show that under the TFP
shock, wage gap declines, while it widens under housing preference and hu-
man capital transformation shocks. Moreover, under the LTV shock, wage
gap shrinks in the short-run only. Robustness checks provide consistent re-
sults with the base model. However, testing different modelling assumptions
show that there is a lower deviation in wage gap under a higher bank capital
adjustment cost.
Finally, the third chapter studies the effects of an insolvent banking sector
on skill premium with the presence of a skill accumulation channel. We find
that under the TFP shock, a shock to skill transformation and a shock to
diversion of assets skill premium reduces. We also find that under the TFP
shock, the bank capital declines, but it increases under the other three shocks.
The shock to the probability of the number of exiting banks increases skill
premium due to higher supply of unskilled labour and lower wages for these
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This thesis investigates wage and income gaps between heterogeneous house-
holds (i.e. between household-savers and household-borrowers) using dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models for the U.S. economy.
U.S. wage gap has been rising for the past decades. Several factors might
have affected this raise in income gap. Firstly, workers’skills can be obtained
through education (long-term learning process) and job training (short-term
accumulation of specific skills). Both these learning processes provide work-
ers with relevant skills in order to be productive at their workplace and earn
higher wages. However, 34% of the U.S. population aged 25 and over ob-
tained a bachelors or higher degree while only 10.4% has a college degree.
The rest of the population has a high school degree or lower.1 Moreover, the
popularity of zero-hour contracts by employers show that unskilled work-
ers are more likely to have such contracts. Secondly, new technologies have
replaced unskilled workers while high-skilled workers have been rewarded
with higher wages. Another explanation for the change in wage gap can be
globalisation, which creates greater competition in labour markets negatively
affecting low-skilled workers.
This study does not exclude the importance of the mentioned factors on
wage gap; however, this research only investigates skills and households’time
preference that are assumed as the main aspects of wage gap. Due to the
quarterly basis of various financial and productivity shocks, only on- and
off-job training are assumed as a main source of accumulating new skills
(see, for example, Dadgar and Trimble, 2015). The main assumption is that
there are skilled and unskilled workers who accumulate new skills through job
training. The 2015 findings of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD, 2015) show that to reduce income gap lower skilled
workers need to invest time and money in their human capital. However, as
they have to earn wages for their everyday consumption, they devote most
of their time to work instead of human capital accumulation.
1See Table 3 Detailed Years of School Completed by People 25 Years and Over by Sex,
Age Groups, Race and Hispanic Origin: 2017 in the U.S. Census Educational Attainment
in the United States: 2017
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There are studies using DSGE models that investigate wealth redistrib-
ution across households under changing monetary policies (see Alpanda and
Zubairy, 2016, Sommer and Sullivan, 2018), however, these studies do not
analyse what happens to wage gap with the presence of financial shocks.
Therefore, the main contribution of this thesis is to research the effects of
financial and productivity shocks on wage and wealth gaps and how findings
can change under different banking sectors.
Starting with a brief description of the thesis, each chapter contributes
to the analyses of the role of different types of banking sectors on wage
and income gaps by using DSGE models. The first chapter investigates the
effects of a solvent banking sector on wage and wealth gaps. The banks
operate in a perfect competition. The solvent banking and heterogeneous
households are built on Iacoviello (2015). Heterogeneity is presented by two
households: household-savers and household-borrowers. The human capital
accumulation channel is introduced to examine the skill premium (wage gap)
following Jones et al. (1993). The second chapter, which extends Chapter
1, introduces banks that operate under an imperfect competition. A solvent
banking sector allows studying only the demand side of the credit market,
while imperfect competition allows analysing the effects of both demand and
supply sides of the credit market on wage gap. The third chapter accounts for
the bank runs and bankruptcies to analyse their effects on wage gap. Another
contribution of Chapter 3 is that skilled and unskilled workers come from one
household. Therefore, workers can now switch between the skill groups from
being unskilled to becoming high skilled, and vice versa. This aspect was
missing in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 due to the modelling assumptions that
allowed household-borrowers to borrow. With the new assumptions presented
in Chapter 3, the impact on wage gap can be analysed under a stable banking
sector or bank runs.
More analytically, the first chapter presents two types of households, who
differ in terms of their time preference and, therefore, wealth and skills that
create heterogeneity between these two households. First households are
called ‘household-savers’ or ‘patient’ households whose discount factor is
higher. Thus, these households save part of their income, purchase hous-
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ing, invest in their skills and, as a result, earn higher wages. The other
group of households are ‘household-borrowers’who are ‘impatient’ house-
holds. Household-borrowers’wages are lower, even though they also invest
in their skills, but their skills are lower than those of household-savers. These
households’wealth is housing, however, their housing wealth is less than those
of savers. As household-borrowers’wages are lower, they can invest in new
skills only by borrowing from banks. Moreover, these households can bor-
row from banks to purchase new housing or to increase the expenditure on
consumption of goods and services.
Therefore, having banks in the model is essential for the household-
borrowers to borrow and invest in human capital accumulation. Banks rep-
resent financial intermediaries who allocate funds from household-savers to
borrowers. Banks do not go bankrupt, thus, they are solvent in this model.
There are two borrowers in this economy. In addition to household-borrowers,
there are also entrepreneurs, who purchase new real estate, which can be used
in the production of final goods. Entrepreneurs also use labour force sup-
plied by households in their production. Both borrowers are subject to a
borrowing constraint that restricts them to borrow more than the value of a
collateral they provide, i.e. housing/real estate.
The findings show that, under a total factor productivity (TFP) shock,
skill premium decreases due to higher increase in household-borrowers’wages
relative to household-savers. Similar to Asimakopoulos and Asimakopoulos
(2017), as household-borrowers enjoy higher supply of loanable funds, they
fund their housing purchasing but also investment in human capital, which
increases the human capital stock of these agents. The preferences shock
shows that when household-savers decide to consume most of their income
and decrease their savings, the supply of loanable funds will drop. As this
shock affects both households, household-borrowers cannot enjoy higher con-
sumption or housing purchasing due to lower loan supply. However, they will
consume most of their income without investing significant amount of funds
and time in their human capital. As a result, skill premium widens and it will
be further enlarged due to household-savers increasing human capital. Simi-
lar to the preferences shock, the human capital transformation shock shows
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the increase in skill premium as household-savers start saving less but in-
vesting more in their human capital accumulation, similar to the findings by
Dadgar and Trimble (2015). Without enough funds available for household-
borrowers to borrow, their human capital will deteriorate due to depreciation
of human capital over time. The household-borrowers’loan-to-value (HH-B
LTV) ratio shock or household-borrowers’borrowing constraint shock leads
to lower wage gap as this shock allows household-borrowers to obtain more
loans to invest in human capital and consumption expenditures. Because
of lower investment in human capital by household-borrowers, the wage gap
widens under the shock to entrepreneurs financial constraint or entrepreneurs’
LTV ratio shock. It happens because, under this shock, household-borrowers
are not able to enjoy higher loans as entrepreneurs.
The welfare analysis show that household-borrowers are generally bet-
ter off under the presence of a human capital accumulation channel. How-
ever, with the TFP shock household-borrowers gain significantly more than
household-savers because of their higher wages. Furthermore, under hu-
man capital transformation shock, household-borrowers’consumption will be
higher, although, the wage gap will widen. The household-borrowers’LTV
ratio shock shows that household-borrowers’welfare improves, although there
is a reduction in consumption gap in the short-run only. Under the entre-
preneurs’LTV ratio shock, both wage and consumption gap increase in the
short and long-run.
Overall, the findings of the first chapter demonstrate the importance of
a human capital accumulation channel, as it can help policymakers control
the welfare gap. Moreover, the tighter regulations of banks can significantly
mitigate the effects of shocks on wage and wealth gaps.
The second chapter presents a DSGE model similar to the one in Chapter
1, by assuming heterogeneous households (household-borrowers and household-
savers) following Gerali et al. (2010). Households can endogenously accu-
mulate human capital by investing in human capital, similar to Jones et
al. (1993). However, the main difference between the two chapters is that
Chapter 2 investigates the changes in wage and wealth gaps between these
two households under the imperfect banking competition, while Chapter 1
16
studies the perfect competition market.
An imperfect banking sector allows for both the demand and supply sides
of credit markets to be examined, while studies of solvent banking neglect
the supply side. The imperfect banking competition or market power is
determined by the value of bank capital and interest rate setting on both
deposits and loans. Tighter regulations of bank capital signal the stronger
financial markets and its ability to resist various financial shocks. On the
other hand, loose constraints can help household-borrowers to borrow, even
though, that will be spent on consumption rather than on investment in
human capital. As Piketty and Saez (2014) state, higher human capital
leads to higher productivity, which generates greater economic development.
The findings of Chapter 2 demonstrate that under housing preference
and human capital transformation shocks, wage gap widens, while short-run
wage gap drops under the TFP and household-borrowers’LTV ratio shocks.
With the TFP shock, wages of both households increase allowing households
to boost their consumption and investment in human capital. Consequently,
wage gap decreases. Housing preference shock leads to higher wage gap
due to larger labour supply by household-borrowers and less investment in
human capital by household-savers. Household-borrowers’LTV ratio shock
produces lower wage gap in the short-run, but creates larger wage gap in the
long-run. It is a result of higher investment in human capital by household-
borrowers, and lower investment by household-savers, who increase their de-
posits instead. Human capital transformation shock results in greater wage
gap between the two households. This happens due to higher investment
in human capital by household-savers, who are already more skilled than
household-borrowers. As a result, household-borrowers will also invest in hu-
man capital, but their investment will not allow them to catch up with their
savers counterparts.
Different modelling assumptions show that household-borrowers are gen-
erally worse offthan the household-savers. Moreover, wage gap is lower under
the higher capital adjustment parameter across all four shocks compared to
other modelling assumptions.
The third chapter investigates the skill premium, the ratio between skilled
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and unskilled workers’wages to analyse the changes in wage and wealth gaps
between skilled and unskilled workers. This chapter extends the ideas of
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 by assuming one single household that consists of
bankers and workers, as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). However, the main
contribution is that workers in this household are both skilled and unskilled,
following He and Liu (2008). The skill transformation channel is introduced
in order for workers to be able to switch between the groups that contain
skilled or unskilled workers. That means that the workers can become more
or less skilled and move from an unskilled group to a skilled group. Moreover,
this allows for the avoidance of the division of households between household-
borrowers and household-savers as each of these groups may contain both
skilled and unskilled workers. Furthermore, this helps investigate the supply
of labour by two workers and, consequently their wages and skill premium.
Chapter 3 also extends the banking sector, while introducing an unstable
financial market that can bankrupt and experience bank runs, which is built
on Gertler and Karadi (2011). This helps to analyse how the instability
of banking sectors can affect the supply of skilled and unskilled labour and
skill premium under various financial and productivity shocks. However,
due to the AR(I) processes used in this chapter, the positive shock will be
exactly mirroring the negative shock of the same type. Therefore, this chapter
presented a strong and stable banking sector.
The findings show that overall the skill premium decreases under the most
shocks. For instance, under the TFP shock skill premium decreases due to
lower supply of unskilled labour that increases their wages. Shock to skill
transformation also produces lower skill premium because of declined wages
of skilled workers. It is interesting that wage gap increases under the similar
shock in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. Shock to diversion of funds leads to a
significant drop in the skill premium due to the rise in wages of unskilled
workers. However, the findings also show that the bank capital decreases
under these three shocks, which means that there are less funds available for
firms to invest in the production. Finally, the shock to the probability of the
number of exiting banks creates an increase in the skill premium, as unskilled
workers’wages go down relative to skilled workers’wages. Moreover, under
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this shock, the bank capital increases, which signals a strong and stable
banking sector.
Robustness checks show that the findings stay robust under different mod-
elling assumptions.
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Chapter 1: Solvent banks and economic gaps
1.1 Introduction
Income redistribution and wage gap have been examined extensively over
the past years (see i.e. Goldin and Katz, 2008 and Hornstein et al ., 2005 for
reviews). In particular, there has been an upward trend on wage gap since
1980, reaching its highest level, since 1915, in the recent years (see Goldin
and Katz, 2008).
However, the aforementioned literature has not systematically examined
the effect on income and wage gap with the inclusion of a banking sector
and the associated financial frictions. This is despite the fact that previous
studies have shown the significant spill-over effects to the economy when
a banking sector is included (i.e. Goodhart et al., 2006, Dib, 2010 and
Iacoviello, 2015). Moreover, it is crucial to assess the role of the various
financial frictions in the economy when housing is being used as collateral,
since it is the key asset for about 2/3 of the U.S. population.2 The value of
housing is higher than that of gross domestic product and it has a significant
impact on the financially-constrained agents (Alpanda and Zubairy, 2016 and
Asimakopoulos and Asimakopoulos, 2017), which becomes more pronounced
in the presence of banks (Iacoviello, 2015).
Therefore, the aim of this study is to combine these research streams
to examine the impact of various productivity and financial shocks to the
economy, and in particular consumption and wage gaps between two house-
holds under the presence of endogenous human capital accumulation, banks
and financial frictions. Matsuyama (2006) argues that less research has been
done using "endogenous formation of class structure" assumptions.3 There-
fore, in this chapter we would like to fill this gap and allow for households to
endogenously accumulate their human capital.
In particular, in order to deal with the frequency difference in the occur-
2See Table 14 of the U.S. Census Bureau Homeownership Rates for the U.S. and
Regions for the period 1965-2015.
3Galor and Moav (2003) also state that the main driver for economic growth is no
longer the physical capital but human capital.
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rence of human capital investment changes, productivity and credit shocks,
we use short-time certificates and on- and off-job training as a way of ac-
cumulating human capital (see Dadgar and Trimble, 2015 for short-time
education). This way we are able to assess the effects of financial shocks
on wage and consumption gaps on a quarterly basis taking into account the
role of human capital accumulation. To that end, we develop a modified dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with a banking sector
and financial frictions, following Iacoviello (2015), and we introduce a human
capital accumulation channel as in Jones et al. (1993).
It is implicitly assumed that households can change their productivity
when they are allowed to affect their human capital by educating and/or
training themselves. Therefore, households can invest time and goods to
become more productive. Agents with higher productivity are more signifi-
cant in firms’production process. This leads to higher profits for firms and
higher wage rates. The increased wages can be invested in human capital
to further boost productivity or accumulate housing, and used as collateral
to draw more loans from the banks. Therefore, the human capital accumu-
lation channel can play a crucial role on wage and consumption gaps under
the presence of banks.
With respect to the banking sector, it has been shown that banks can am-
plify and propagate shocks to the real economy (see, for example, Bernanke
et al., 1999). This is driven from the decision or inability of the borrowers to
pay back their loans causing destructions in bank activities. This way banks
cannot repay deposits to savers and receive the part of their own capital
they used for loans, leading to creation of shocks with spill-over effects to
the entire economy. Therefore, credit markets are a source of propagation
and amplification of financial shocks. However, Cooley et al. (2004), focus-
ing solely on the demand side of the credit market, show the limited role of
banks as financial intermediaries and that bank capital does not have any
influence on bank’s ability to lend.
On the one hand, another stream of literature argues that bank capital
substantially distresses investment and amplifies financial shocks. Gerali et
al. (2010), for example, show that changing a bank capital to assets ratio
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can decrease the impact of technology shocks to investment. Christiano et
al. (2008) also give controversial results for banks’role prior to the crisis.
They claim that banks intermediation plays a minor role in a shock creation
process and further amplification to other industries.
On the other hand, Meh and Moran (2010) empirically demonstrate that
financial and technological shocks are closely related to bank capital. Banks
with lower or decreasing capital have to reduce their lending to firms causing
a decline in investment and output levels. Therefore, the banking sector is
an independent source for creating negative shocks along with propagating
and amplifying them.
Similar to Meh and Moran (2010), Dib (2010) shows how financial shocks
come from the banking sector and how banks can further propagate the
shocks to economies. deWalque et al. (2010) also illustrate that capital
requirements can mitigate financial instability in an economy, but it can also
negatively affect output in the long-run.
Kamber et al. (2015) empirically demonstrate the negative effects of
financial frictions on decision to consume and invest. Under financial shocks
borrowers are constrained by the value of their collateral. This restrains them
from borrowing while decreasing investment in capital and consumption.
As we can see from the aforementioned studies, the banking sector is
an important component in these models. It is proven that the banking
sector not only amplifies and propagates financial shocks but also generates
them within the sector. However, these studies mainly focus on the effects
of the banking sector on total output and investment, but not on wage gap.
Although there are studies (see Alpanda and Zubairy, 2016, Sommer and
Sullivan, 2018) who incorporate heterogeneous agents in DSGE models with
housing market, these papers focus mainly on the implications of changes in
interest rates on wealth redistribution across households.
This chapter, therefore, extends this stream of literature in two dimen-
sions: i) we assess the impact of the banking sector on income and wage
gaps; and ii) we utilise relatively stylised real business cycle (RBC) model
with heterogeneous agents that can endogenously choose their human capital.
Income gap has drawn a lot of attention in the literature. Douglas (1930)
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was amongst the first to observe wage distribution, stating that clerical work-
ers are substituted by new equipment. Acemoglu (1998) also shows that there
is a direct connection between workers’level of income and human capital.
For example, technological change increases the demand for skilled workers.
In addition, Mankiw (2000) states that households with low wealth are
more likely to face binding borrowing constraints since they consume most
of their disposal income while making small or no savings. Agents with high
level of wealth are able to smooth their consumption and have access to finan-
cial markets. Under an increase in interest rates, borrowing becomes more
expensive, which means spenders’debts rise. However, savers (households
with high level of wealth) are better off since the interest rate for savings
rises too. This leads to a bigger income gap between savers and borrowers.
Lemieux (2006) empirically tests how post-secondary education can in-
crease the level of wage rate and its distribution. He shows that the demand
for highly-educated workers is always higher compared to lower educated
workers, resulting in a wage gap between the two. Goldin and Katz (2008)
also investigate wage gap and they find that wage rates mainly depend on
the level of education or skills.
When thinking of gap one might consider gap in wage and/or income.
Piketty and Saez (2014) discuss that gap doesn’t only include wage or income.
They state that it can consist of two parts: income gap and capital inequality.
This also follows the gap decomposition provided by the U.S. Council of
Economic Advisers. In this chapter we want to investigate both sources of
wage gap. Thus, in our model households differ in both wage and wealth.4
OECD (2015) research on wage gap shows the existence of a higher income
gap for less educated people. The reason for this is not only due to lower
investment in education, but also due to shorter time spent in education
compared to skilled people. In addition, when workers invest as much as
their skilled counterparts, they will still earn less than the latter. Low-skilled
people spend more time working to earn wages to invest in human capital,
while devoting less time on the skill accumulation process itself, which results
4In our model, we assume housing as a stock that households can purchase depending
on their level of income.
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in less skills accumulated. This increases income and wealth gaps between
the two groups.
Dadgar and Trimble (2015) also assess the effects of increasing human
capital on wages using quarterly data for short-term and long-term certifi-
cates.5 They find that increasing human capital has a positive and substan-
tial impact on workers’earnings. Murphy and Topel (2016) find that larger
wage gap, or sluggish rise in skilled workers, leads to a decline in economic
growth rate. They also find that workers have incentives to invest more in
their human capital as the returns are higher, leading to higher quality of
skills. This results in wage gap in workers’earnings, which creates a wage
power for those who are highly skilled. Therefore, to gain new skills and be
competitive in the market less skilled workers need to continuously invest in
human capital.
The set-up of our model merges the key features of the rich literature
in endogenous human capital accumulation and financial frictions. Follow-
ing Iacoviello (2015), who find that redistribution and other financial shocks
are responsible for about 2/3 of output collapse during the recent crisis, we
have two types of households, savers and borrowers. Both households pro-
vide labour to entrepreneurs and they both invest a fraction of their income
in house purchasing. It is widely known, though, that households differ in
their level of productivity, which directly affects the level of income they can
potentially earn. Therefore, agents can accumulate skills to improve their
productivity. Thus, the main departure from Iacoviello’s model is the inclu-
sion of an endogenous human capital accumulation channel, which effectively
allows households to improve their productivity by investing in goods and
time in human capital.
In addition, following Iacoviello (2015), we assume that the two types
of households exhibit different time preferences that lead to different asset
holdings and wealth. Patient agents are wealthier and represent savers in
the current model. Savers do not need to borrow and are the indirect loan
5They use quarterly data because credentials increase every quarter, showing the
changes of earnings and wages each quarter. This helps understand the relationship be-
tween obtained certificates and inequality.
24
providers to the economy via their bank deposits. Moreover, since they
are wealthier they are able to invest more in human capital compared to
household-borrowers, which leads to a wage gap between the two agents.
Household-borrowers represent the impatient households. They invest
less in their human capital due to lower income level compared to savers. In
order for borrowers to improve their human capital they need to take out
loans from banks. The amount of loans they can draw depends on their
collateral, which is housing in this model. This is also known as a credit con-
straint. Banks manage savers deposit accounts and issue loans to household-
borrowers and entrepreneurs who produce the final goods and maximise their
profit. Banks play essentially the role of intermediaries between savers and
borrowers. In other words, banks transfer financial resources between agents
over time.
The results of the model show that under productivity shocks, wage and
income gaps can be reduced significantly having positive long-run effects.
We further find that under preferences or financial shocks, wage gap will
rise both in terms of welfare and wage rates. Finally, we find that under a
human capital productivity shock the welfare gap will be reduced both in
the short-run and in the long-run. However, wage gap will only be reduced
in the short-run, leading to higher wage gap in the long-run.
Performing robustness checks on the calibration of the financial frictions
we find that the key results remain robust. It is worth noting though that a
reduction in capital-asset requirement ratio for banks may lead to higher wage
and consumption gap in the long-run compared to our benchmark model.
Finally, we assess the effect of the key modelling assumptions via pro-
viding three alternative models. In the first model we eliminate the human
capital accumulation channel. In the second model we eliminate banks and
in the last model we eliminate both human capital accumulation channel
and banks. Our findings suggest that lending facilities in general mitigate
the propagation of the shocks to wage and consumption gaps. In addition,
the human capital accumulation channel mainly improves the welfare of
household-borrowers and it significantly affects wage gap. Finally, savers’
welfare remains at a similar level with the benchmark model under all the
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shocks and the different models.
We also find that as household-borrowers are better offwith the presence
of lending facilities, the role of banks is not important in this model as long
as household-savers can play a role of lenders and there are available funds
for borrowers to borrow. However, it is convenient to have a banking sector
as it helps us to extend it for the rest two chapters.
Therefore, from a policy perspective, human capital accumulation needs
to be enhanced via easier access to training and/or education for the welfare
gap to be reduced. In addition, the results indicate that the bank capital-
asset ratio needs to be effi ciently controlled and monitored because it is
crucial for the propagation of the shocks to wage and consumption gaps.
Moreover, the lending facilities available to borrowers make them better off
and be able to invest in human capital.6
In the next section, we extensively discuss the literature review on both
DSGE models with banks and human capital. Next, we present the dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium model of this chapter. Section 1.4 outlines the
decentralised competitive equilibrium. Section 1.5 presents the calibration
of our model. Section 1.6 includes the analysis of the results. Section 1.7
provides the various robustness checks, and Section 1.8 concludes the chapter.
1.2 Related literature
In this section we present two streams of literature. Firstly, we discuss the
importance of a banking sector and its development in DSGE models. In
the second part of the section we discuss the literature that covers human
capital and wage gaps.
As we have already mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, there
are studies that include heterogeneous agents in DSGE models. Lindquist
(2005) implements a DSGE model on Swedish data to understand the factors
that have caused changes in equality in Sweden. He and Liu (2008) and He
(2012) also use an RBC model to analyse wage gap in the U.S. and the
6The role of banks for the propagation of the shocks to overall output and investment
are well documented in the literature and our results do not differ significantly. Therefore,
we mainly focus on wage and income gaps.
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important role of a human capital accumulation channel in decreasing the
wage gap. There are also papers that look at the redistribution of wealth
among different types of households (see Alpanda and Zubairy, 2016, Sommer
and Sullivan, 2018). However, the papers above do not study the role of a
banking sector in wage gap using DSGE models, which we cover in this
chapter.
On the other hand, there is a stream of literature that uses causal re-
lationship. For example, Amountzias (2018) studies the causal relationship
between income redistribution and financial instability by conducting non-
Granger causality test. This income redistribution is caused by a high de-
mand for loans by low-income households who accumulate debt, which cre-
ates destructions and uncertainty in financial markets. They found that in-
come gap enlarges instability in financial markets with greater accumulation
of debt, caused by excess loan supply.
Another paper by Berisha and Meszaros (2018) examines the economic
growth and income gap by conducting VAR informational suffi ciency test.
Their findings suggest that aggregate household debt creates higher income
gap, which leads to a decline in output growth and economic weakness in
the long-run. Moreover, economic growth generates a wider gap between top
and low-income households.
1.2.1 The importance of banks
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models have been developing for
many decades (see, for instance, Lucas, 1977). However, the most followed
one is presented by Kydland and Prescott (1982) as a theory of real business
cycles, which explains the stylised facts through technological change. Clas-
sic dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models consist of two
agents, i.e. households and firms. However, the importance of a banking
sector has led to its inclusion in DSGE models as intermediaries between
savers and borrowers.7
The banking sector can amplify and propagate shocks to the real economy
7See Rebelo (2005) and Christiano et al. (2018) for further details on the history of
real business cycle (RBC) models.
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(i.e. Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997 and Bernanke et al., 1999). For instance,
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) study the effects of credit constraints on agents
and the economy. A temporary productivity shock can negatively affect the
ability of agents to borrow and, thus, to invest in production and increase
their total expenditure by reducing the value of a collateral. The reduction of
a collateral will drop over time while the effects of the shock are propagated
further to the real economy.
Therefore, credit markets are a vital source of propagation and amplifi-
cation of various shocks. This can lead to greater bankruptcies, declines in
asset prices and bank failures that play a main role in increasing depression
in the economy. These credit-market imperfections are included in DSGE
models to analyse their effects. This sheds light on shocks that significantly
influence economies while taking into account credit frictions. However, Coo-
ley et al. (2004) use models that focus only on the demand side of credit
markets. They claim that banks have a limited role of intermediaries be-
tween borrowers and lenders. They also state that bank capital does not
significantly influence the ability of banks to lend. In other words, lenders
are suppliers of their savings, who lend these funds to borrowers without any
need in intermediaries’interaction, such as banks.
Unlike Cooley et al. (2004), Meh and Moran (2004) show that banks have
to rely on their capital when considering risky loans. Their model presents
banks who face credit constraints. They also demonstrate the importance
of firms’balance sheets. Their model illustrate two moral hazard problems.
Firstly, as a standard, they assume entrepreneurs produce goods. Entre-
preneurs undertake risky investments and activities in order to make higher
profit. However, the higher the risk the smaller the chance of getting loans
from banks, which pushes firms to invest their own money. Secondly, some
banks might still issue loans to such firms, while tolerating the higher risk
of a borrower to default on loans. Moreover, such banks might not monitor
borrowers’activities and use of loans as screening procedures are expensive
and time consuming. Depositors realise the risk, which they do not want to
take. Thus, savers require banks to invest their own capital in those risky
projects making banks face financial constraints.
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By introducing financial intermediaries in DSGE models, researchers seek
to forecast and prevent economic crunches before they have already appeared.
The role of monetary policies and central banks’ control over commercial
banks help to understand the process of transmission of shocks. For instance,
Angeloni and Faia (2009) confirm a banks’central role in shock transmissions.
They also prove the significance of bank capital and leverage ratios. Banks
can redeploy assets with the aim of liquidating defaults. When banks issue
loans they rely on firms’cash flows. However, cash flows can be volatile and
unreliable, which creates uncertainty in a bank’s balance sheet. Moreover,
this raises a ratio of bank loans to deposits that can lead to bank runs as
savers lose their confidence in bank liquidity. Therefore, banks should mostly
rely on their own capital.
Bank runs are dangerous as they can weaken banks’liquidity and stability
in credit markets. If, under some news shocks, depositors assume a bank
might collapse then they will start withdrawing their monies. Even strong
and stable banks can bankrupt under those conditions. The main reason
for this is banks’ lending activities. Banks can demand the earlier issued
loans back, but they will lose their borrowers. This will further damage
confidence in banks creating discredit, mistrust and instability in financial
markets. With constraints in credit markets, production will immediately
decline, leading to the slowdown of economic growth.
On the other hand, there is a literature that provides opposite evidence
of a role of bank capital. They agree that bank capital has a considerable
impact on investment, but argue about its role in amplification of financial
shocks. Gerali et al. (2010), for example, show that bank capital doesn’t have
significant effect following monetary policy shocks. However, while consider-
ing a ratio of capital to assets, bank capital reduces the impact of technology
shocks on investment. Similar to previous literature, Gerali et al. (2010)
show how banks can decrease output levels during crises.
Following previous studies, deWalque et al. (2010) paper develops a model
that shows the relationship between banks and entrepreneurs. The model
also presents lending injections into a credit market. If these injections are
not financed through taxes then inflation rates can go up. As in Dib (2010),
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they illustrate that capital requirements can mitigate financial instability in
the economy, but it can also lead to fluctuations in output in the long-run.
Moreover, the difference of maturity dates for deposits and for loans can also
play an important role in creating shocks in a banking sector.
As discussed above, banking capital is important as it indicates banks’
stability and liquidity. Iacoviello (2015) introduces a model, which can rea-
sonably fit the U.S. data. He produces a model with banks and heterogeneous
households. Borrowers pledge their houses as a collateral to get loans from
financial intermediaries. As the recent crisis shows, banks have to sell houses
at lower prices, which don’t cover the loan value and additional expenses
associated with it. Thus, borrowers pay back less than they agreed by credit
contracts. It is important to show how the banking sector might transfer
and spillover financial shocks causing persistent and substantial effects on
the real economy.
Gertler et al. (2017) present a model where they show how bank runs
can negatively affect consumption, investment and output. A strong bank
with a good balance sheet can be resistant to various financial shocks, which
positively affects borrowers and eliminates bank runs. However, banks with
weaker balance sheet can experience instabilities even under small shocks.
Therefore, it makes the research in banking crucial in understanding the
behaviour of agents under the presence of shocks.
1.2.2 Human capital and wage gap
As it can be seen from the previous studies of DSGE models, a banking
sector is an important component in these models. It plays a crucial role of
shock creator and propagator to an economy. The main aim of this chapter is
to examine the effects of financial shocks on wage and wealth gaps between
heterogeneous households. Therefore, in this chapter we investigate how
household-borrowers and household-savers are affected by financial shocks
when there are both a banking sector and an endogenous human capital
accumulation channel present in the model.
We assume that households differ in terms of their time preference, which
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creates other differences, such as wealth. Therefore, household-savers are
patient while household-borrowers are impatient. Households also differ in
their level of income and expenditures
We assume that households can invest goods and time in the skill accu-
mulation process - their human capital. Savers will invest more and spend
more time, meaning the return on their human capital will be higher while
borrowers will face lower returns. The paper by Ben-Porath (1967) also
supports the fact that to accumulate human capital, households have to
constantly improve their skills over time. Therefore, the higher the human
capital the greater the workers’earnings will be. Thus, human capital can
be assumed as human wealth. We also assume that agents have some ini-
tial endowment. As time passes, this endowment increases if they invest in
human capital. Furthermore, human capital depreciates over time, which
makes households continuously invest in their human capital. Both savers
and borrowers are subject to the same depreciation rate. However, since
savers have higher wage rates they invest more in their human capital accu-
mulation, while household-borrowers have to borrow from banks in order to
invest. Therefore, this increases wage gap between the two households.
Research in income gap has always been a hot topic for discussions. For
example, Douglas (1930) is one of the first economists, who observed wage
distribution in the U.S. for the period of 1890 to 1926. As he states in his
work, if clerical workers are substituted by new equipment then this leads to
the decrease of their wages. The wage decrease is also caused by the increas-
ing number of white-collar workers as there was mass access to education.
Moreover the wages of uneducated and low-skilled workers were higher, which
he assumes was caused by the decrease in numbers of immigrants. These two
changes in wages of skilled and unskilled workers caused a growth in wage
gap.
Katz and Autor (1999) argue that higher skills lead to a greater wage gap.
However, they also analyse factors that affect wage gap, such as demand and
supply (including quality) of labour, which play a crucial role in wage gap.
When there is a rise in supply of labour in a labour market, the competition
will be larger leading to lower wage rates. On the other hand, if there is a
31
greater demand for skilled labour, then workers’wages will increase too. This
has led to a rise in wage gap that can be seen from the U.S. wage statistics
from 1950 onwards, excluding a decline in the1970s.8
Caselli (1999) also argues about the role of technological changes in the
U.S., which has led to the demand for high-skilled labour. He empirically
finds that skilled labour holds more capital because of their higher wages,
which also allows them to purchase various assets. Moreover, with realisation
of higher returns on capital and skills, workers will move towards human
capital and skill accumulation. On one hand, this reduces the wage gap. On
the other hand, higher returns on capital stock will divide highly-skilled and
low-skilled workers, while leading to a wider wage gap.
Similar to Caselli (1999), Krusell et al. (2000) explain the unfavourable
position of unskilled labour. They claim that unskilled labour is more easily
replaced by new technologies, while the increase of such technologies im-
prove marginal product of high-skilled workers, making skilled workers more
complementary to equipment. Therefore, the optimal policy to improve well-
being and wages of unskilled workers is to propose solutions focused on train-
ing and skill accumulation for low-skilled labour. With higher skills, workers
can improve their productivity by using new machinery and equipment in-
stead of being substituted by new technologies.
Using the Krusell et al. (2000) model, Lindquist (2005) analyses the
Swedish wage gap, which has been rising over the past decades. He finds that
the main driver for the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers is the
demand for labour. With new technological changes, the demand for skilled
workers increased, while the growth of skilled labour supply declined. This
has affected the relative wages earned in Sweden, increasing skill premium.
In our model we assume that households are able to attend on- and off-
job training to improve their skills and human capital. Similar, Hornstein et
al. (2005) explain the importance of investment in training and how it can
positively affect the wage gap. They discuss that low-skilled workers with no
college education gain skills through on-the-job learning. However, they also
8See March Current Population Survey, Public Use Micro Samples or Panel Study of
Income Dynamics for further data on wage inequality and wage gaps.
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stress the fact that under various shocks the wage gap always increases in the
long-run, while unskilled workers are being worse off. Moreover, this labour
are also more likely to loose their jobs than their skilled counterparts.9
He and Liu (2008) also present a model that shows the importance of hu-
man capital and workers’incentives in investing in skill accumulation because
of equipment-skill complementarity effect. As in Krusell et al. (2000), they
show that skill premium will increase due to lower marginal productivity of
unskilled labour under technological changes. But technological change is not
the only factor that affects wage gap. The return on education and training
also plays a substantial role in explaining changes in wage gap. Generally,
higher supply of skilled workers suppresses wage gap in wages as well as in
consumption and wealth.
Similar to the literature above, He (2012) finds that wage gap increases
when there is a higher demand for skilled labour. However, this demand mo-
tivates low-skilled workers to invest in new skills, which will lead in a greater
supply of skilled workers. Additionally, Acemoglu and Autor (2012) state
that with increasing changes in technologies it becomes more important for
policymakers to improve workers’skills. This includes the skills of unskilled
workers who perform tasks that do not require higher skills. This might
change the direction of technological change, which will eventually adjust to
a demand for skilled labour.
Autor (2014) then argues that demand for labour depends on their pro-
ductivity, which also dictates the wages workers will earn. Workers’ pro-
ductivity depends on skills they accumulate. As he analyses, the wage gap
has been rising in the U.S. as workers stopped accumulating necessary skills
for various reasons. However, Autor (2014) also states that the wage gap
presented in an economy is necessary to encourage workers to accumulate
new skills continuously. Wage gap or inequality cannot be fully avoided but
it can be decreased through long-term policies, which can stimulate workers
productivity through skills and reasonably-paid jobs.
Murphy and Topel (2016) and Gomes and Kuehn (2017) findings are
consistent with the literature in human capital. Murphy and Topel (2016)
9See World Bank Development Indicators for U.S. unemployment by education levels.
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state that insuffi cient supply of skilled labour increases gap, and with lower
growth in skilled labour the economic growth will slow down too. Gomes
and Kuehn (2017) find that highly-skilled workers increase productivity of
firms and economy. With higher human capital, individuals can earn greater
wages, which can lower wage gap. This incentivises workers to accumulate
human capital through acquiring new skills.
1.3 Model outline
The proposed model is a closed economy with four agents: savers, borrowers,
entrepreneurs and banks. Households consume final goods and purchase
houses. Households consist of savers and borrowers similar to patient and
impatient households as in Iacoviello (2015). Both types of households own
houses and accumulate their human capital by investing their money and
time in training/education, similar to Jones et al. (1993). Entrepreneurs
produce the final goods and maximise their profit. Banks, in this model, are
the intermediaries between savers and borrowers. They accumulate savings
from household-savers in deposit accounts and with their own capital issue
loans to entrepreneurs and household-borrowers.
1.3.1 Households
Households, in the model, are represented by a continuum of infinitely living
households of a unit mass. There are two types of households in our econ-
omy. The first type represents savers, who have access to asset markets. The
second type consists of households who are borrowers. Both households own










where βti is the discount factor for an i
agent at period t, and 0 < βti < 1, Ct is household’s consumption at period t;
Hi,t is housing; and NHCi,t and Ni,t represent time spent in human capital ac-
cumulation and work respectively. u (·) is strictly increasing, strictly concave
and twice continuously differentiable.
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Household-savers Each period household-savers choose consumptionCH,t,
housing HH,t and the time they spend in human capital accumulation NHCH,t












where βtH is discount factor for savers (0 < β
t
H < 1). j shows the share in
housing preference, Ac,t is a preferences shock and τ is the share of leisure.
Savers are subject to the following budget constraint:
CH,t + I
HC
H,t +Dt + qt (HH,t −HH,t−1) = RH,t−1Dt−1 +WH,tHCH,t−1NH,t (2)
where at period t choose housing HH,t and the level of investment in human
capital IHCH,t . They also have deposit accounts, DS,t, in banks and purchase
houses at price qt.11 They receive interest payments, RH,t, on savings and
get WH,t wage rate for NH,t worked hours. Finally, HCH,t is the level of
productivity defined by the human capital accumulation.
Human capital accumulation channel We assume that households
are able to accumulate new skills by attending on- and off-job training and
obtaining further short-term education. This improves their productivity
and allows them to receive higher returns from labour as they earn higher
wages. The human capital accumulation channel is set-up as in Jones et al.
(1993):









where Bt is the shock to the human capital transformation, θ shows the im-
portance of goods input in the transformation of skills and χ is the parameter
that shows the returns to scale. Human capital is also subject to depreciation
10Throughout the paper we normalise time to unity. As a result, leisure plus time at
work and time at human capital accumulation add up to one.
11The house/real estate prices are the same for all agents in the model.
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over time, which is given by δSK .
Household-borrowers Borrowers own houses and borrow, so that they
invest enough to improve productivity via increasing their human capital
level. At period t household-borrowers maximise their lifetime welfare by
choosing CS,t consumption, HS,t housing, time at work NS,t and time in
















They are subject to the budget constraint:
CS,t + I
HC
S,t + qt (HS,t −HS,t−1) +RS,t−1LS,t−1 = LS,t +WS,tHCS,t−1NS,t (5)
where IHCS,t is the investment in human capital. LS,t determines the amount
of borrowing from banks at RS,t interest rate. WS,t is the wages rate and
HCS,t is the human capital accumulation in terms of productivity.
Household-borrowers are also subject to the following borrowing con-
straint:







where ρS measures the slow adjustment of the borrowing constraint over time
and mS indicates the constraint of the households on the amount they are
able to borrow by the value of their collateral (loan-to-value ratio). Finally,
AMS,t is the exogenous shock which affects the households borrowing ability.
Following Iacoviello (2015), we assume that Equation 6 binds in a neighbor-
hood of the steady states if βtS is lower than the weighted average of the
discount factors of household-savers and banks. This assumption is also used
in the following chapters.
Human capital accumulation channel Similarly to household-savers,
the household-borrowers accumulate human capital which improves their pro-
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ductivity and helps them compete in the labour market:










Banks in this model are intermediaries between savers and borrowers. They
play a crucial role since the banking sector can create shocks and then propa-





where βtB is banks’discount factor and CB,t is banks’consumption at period
t.
In addition, banks are subject to the following budget constraint:
CB,t +RH,t−1Dt−1 + Lt = Dt +RS,tLS,t−1 +RE,tLE,t−1 (9)
where Lt = LS,t + LE,t measures total loans issued by banks. Banks can-
not issue loans more than the capital they have for liquidity and stability
reasons.12
Banks are also subject to the following capital adequacy constraint:
Lt −Dt ≥ ρD (Lt−1 −Dt−1) + (1− γ)(1− ρD) (Lt) (10)
where ρD is the parameter which shows the partial adjustment in bank cap-
ital and γ shows the long-term target of capital-asset ratio. Following Ia-
coviello (2015), we assume that this constraint binds in a neighborhood of
the steady states as banks’discount factor is lower than the discount factor
of household-savers, implying a relative impatience assumption. We also use
this assumption in Chapter 2 and 3.
Entrepreneurs produce a final good by using housing and labour provided
12Assuming that banks are solvent simplifies our analysis. Extending the model to
include non-solvent banks is very interesting but beyond the scope of this chapter.
37





where βtE is their discount factor and CE,t denotes consumption at period t.
They also maximise their profit given by:
Π = Yt −WH,tHCH,t−1NH,t −WS,tHCS,t−1NS,t −RV,tqtHE,t−1 −RE,tLE,t−1
(12)
where HE,t is entrepreneurs’commercial real estate. We assume a commer-
cial real estate as a collateral for the loans that entrepreneurs’obtain from
banks. There are two reasons for using commercial real estate here. Housing
collateral is practical and crucial. Most borrowings are secured by real estate.
Moreover, housing plays crucial role in business fluctuations.






where υ is the share of entrepreneur’s real estate in the production function
and σ is the share of labour input of household-borrowers in the production
process. Zt represents total factor productivity.
Entrepreneurs are also subject to the budget constraint:
CE,t + qt (HE,t −HE,t−1) +RE,tLE,t−1
+WH,tHCH,t−1NH,t +WS,tHCS,t−1NS,t = Yt + LE,t
(14)
where LE,t denotes loans from banks at RE,t interest rate.
In addition, entrepreneurs’borrowing is constrained by their total income
after all payments have taken place. Therefore, they need to satisfy the
following financial constraint:
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where ρE allows for slow adjustment over time, mH is the real estate loan-
to-value ratio, AME,t is an exogenous shock to entrepreneurs borrowing ability
and the term mN shows the wage bill paid in advance. As entrepreneurs’









constraint will be binding in the neighborhood of the steady state. We follow
this assumption in Chapter 2 and 3.
1.3.3 Aggregate resource constraint and market clearing condi-
tions
The aggregate resource constraint of our economy is given by:
Yt = Ct + It (16)
where total consumption and total investment are given by:






In addition, we have the following market clearing condition for housing:
Ht = HH,t +HS,t +HE,t = 1 (17)
where, we normalise the overall supply of housing to unity, as in Iacoviello
(2015).13




There are five shocks in the model: a TFP shock, a shock to entrepreneurs’
borrowing constraint, a shock to household-borrowers’borrowing constraint,
a shock to preferences, and a shock to human capital transformation. These
exogenous shocks follow AR(I) processes:
log(Zt) = ρZ log(Zt−1) + uZ (18)
log(AME,t) = ρAME log(AME,t−1) + uME (19)
log(AMS,t) = ρAMS log(AMS,t−1) + uMS (20)
log(AC,t) = ρC log(AC,t−1) + uC (21)
log(Bt) = ρB log(Bt−1) + uB (22)
where ujj is independently and identically distributed Gaussian random vari-
ables with zero mean and σjj standard deviation, for jj = {Z,ME,MS,C,B}.
1.4 Decentralised competitive equilibrium
The non-stochastic decentralised competitive equilibrium (DCE) is summarised







S,t , HCH,t, HCS,t, Dt, LS,t, LE,t, Yt}∞t=0 and prices {WH,t,
WS,t, RH,t, RS,t, RE,t, RV,t, qt}∞t=0 such that the two types of households solve
their optimisation problem, and firms and banks maximise their profits, tak-
ing prices and initial conditions for housing as given; and all the markets
clear.14
1.5 Calibration and steady state
In this section we calibrate our model using quarterly U.S. data for the period
1965-2015 and then solve to match the key stylised facts and properties of
the U.S. economy.
14The DCE system is presented in appendix A.
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Starting with households’utility functions we set the weight of leisure τ
equal to 2.25 so that the households on average spend around one third of
their time at work. In addition, the share of the housing preference j is set
equal to 0.084 so that the ratio of loans for household-borrowers-to-output
is about 0.67 as in the quarterly data for loans for the U.S. for the period
of 1965Q1 to 2015Q4 taken from the Flow of Funds Accounts. Moreover,
following Iacoviello (2015), the discount factors for household-savers βH and
household-borrowers βS are set equal to 0.9925 and 0.94 respectively.
Next we proceed with the parameters of the human capital accumulation
channel. The parameter χ is set equal to 0.34 to match the consumption
over output ratio of 0.70.15 In addition, θ is set equal to 0.8 to get a steady
state skill premium equal to 1.60, consistent with the related literature (see
Acemoglu and Autor, 2011 and Angelopoulos et al., 2015). We use skill
premium as an indicator of wage gap.
Human capital depreciation rate, δSK , is usually set to 10%. Heckman
(1976) uses values from 4% to 9%, however, these values are sensitive to
the model’s specification, while He and Liu (2008) use the value of 8%, as
in Stokey (1991). Rosen (1976) gives different values for skill depreciation
rate for high school graduates (5%) and university graduates (19%). In this
chapter we use the depreciation rate value as in Jones et al. (1993).
The loan-to-value ratios are set to 0.9 as in Iacoviello (2015), except
for the mN which equals to 1 to ensure that workers receive their wages in
advance as in Neumeyer and Perri (2005). Also, the capital-asset ratio, γ,
and the partial adjustment parameters in the financial constraints (ρD, ρE
and ρS) are set as in Iacoviello (2015).
16
The real estate elasticity υ and labour share σ in the production function
are set equal to 0.0331 and 0.28 respectively. These parameters help us pin
down the steady state values for the loans to entrepreneurs over output at
15For this target we use hp-filtered and log-transformed U.S. quarterly data for the
period 1965-2015 from NIPA tables.
16We perform a robustness analysis later on so as to assess the importance of those
parameters in our model.
41
0.3817 and total wages over output at about 0.44.18 We also normalise the
steady state values of all the AR(1) processes to unity (i.e., Z = AME =
AMS = AC = B = 1)
Having calibrated the model, as shown in Table 1.1, we solve the non-
stochastic DCE system of equations (A1)-(A26), as presented in the appen-
dix.19 Table 1.2 presents the steady state results of our model together with
the U.S. data averages for the period 1965-2015. The steady state of our
model is very close to that of the data. This confirms our calibration and
the good fit of the model.
Table 1.1: Calibration
Parameter Definition Value Source
βB Banks discount factor 0.945 Iacoviello (2015)
βE Entrepreneurs discount factor 0.94 Iacoviello (2015)
βH HH-S discount factor 0.9925 Iacoviello (2015)
βS HH-B discount factor 0.94 Iacoviello (2015)
j Housing preference share 0.084 Data
τ Elasticity of labour supply 2.25 Data
mN Wage bill paid in advance 1 Neumeyer & Perri (2005)
mH Real estate loan-to-value ratio 0.9 Iacoviello (2015)
mS Housing loan-to-value ratio 0.9 Iacoviello (2015)
γ Capital-asset ratio target 0.9 Iacoviello (2015)
ρD Partial adj. in bank capital 0.233 Iacoviello (2015)
ρE E. borr. constraint adj. 0.63 Iacoviello (2015)
ρS HH-B borr. constraint adj. 0.71 Iacoviello (2015)
υ Real estate share in prod. 0.0331 Data
σ HH labour share in prod. 0.8 Data
θ Goods share in the HCA 0.8 Data
χ Returns to scale in HCA 0.34 Data
δSK HC depreciation rate 0.1 Jones et al. (1993)
17Using again quarterly data for loans for the U.S. for the period of 1965Q1 to 2015Q4
taken from the Flow of Funds Accounts as in Iacoviello (2015).
18For total wages we used data from NIPA Table 2.1 and for output we used data from
WDI.
19Note that throughout the paper we use the abbreviation HH to denote house-
holds, mainly in our tables. Therefore, HH-S stands for household-savers and HH-B for
household-borrowers
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We also calibrate the autocorrelation and standard deviation parameters for
the TFP AR(1) process to match the autocorrelation and standard deviation
of output in our model with the data. Specifically, we set ρZ to 0.9 and σZ
to 0.007 to obtain an autocorrelation of output equal to 0.82 and standard
deviation equal to 1.3.20
Then we set the remaining ρ and σ parameters for the entrepreneurs’
borrowing constraint, households’borrowing constraint, preferences and hu-
man capital transformation processes, to match the relative correlation and
standard deviation to output of loans to entrepreneurs, loans to households,
consumption and wage series respectively. Table 1.3 shows the relevant cal-
ibrated parameters, and Table 1.4 the results from the simulated model in
comparison with the data.
In order to obtain the business cycle moments for our model, we per-
form a second-order approximation of the equilibrium conditions around the
deterministic steady state and we simulate time paths under all the shocks
presented and calibrated in Table 1.3. Then we conduct 500,000 simulations
of 254 periods, where we drop the initial 50, to match the number of ob-
servations in the data we used. Table 1.4 shows that the moments of the
estimated model are close to the moments of the data, as discussed above.
20Quarterly data for output for the period 1965-2015 from WDI were used.
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Table 1.3: Stochastic processes
Parameter Definition Value Source
ρZ AR(1) coef. of TFP 0.9 Data
σZ Std. dev. of TFP 0.007 Data
ρAME AR(1) coef. of Entr. borr. constraint 0.7 Data
σAME Std. dev. of Entr.. borr. constraint 0.004 Data
ρAMS AR(1) coef. of HH. borr. constraint 0.8 Data
σAMS Std. dev. of HH borr. constraint 0.005 Data
ρC AR(1) coef. of preference 0.7 Data
σC Std. dev. of preference 0.0015 Data
ρB AR(1) coef. of HC transformation 0.6 Data
σB Std. dev. of HC transformation 0.007 Data
Table 1.4: Business cycle statistics of the key ratios
Model Data
Xi σ̂(Xi)/σ̂(Y ) ρ̂(Xi, Y ) σ̂(Xi)/σ̂(Y ) ρ̂(Xi, Y )
C 0.94 0.98 0.77 0.86
LE 2.71 0.25 2.72 0.40
LS 1.64 0.54 1.65 0.55
W 0.84 0.91 1.24 0.81
1.6 Impulse response and welfare analysis
In this section, we analyse the effects of various shocks to the economy, and
wage gap in particular, under the presence of banks, financial frictions and
endogenous human capital accumulation. Later on we are going to illustrate
how the existence of banks and/or the endogenous human capital accumula-
tion channel affect the results.
Figures 1.1-1.5 about here
1.6.1 TFP shock
We start with the analysis of a positive one standard deviation tempo-
rary shock to the economy. Figure 1.1 shows that immediately after the
shock output increases, leading to higher demand for inputs in the produc-
tion process. This drives both of the wage rates to increase, leading to
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higher overall consumption. Moreover, deposits for savers increase, leading
to higher supply of loans that are mainly channeled to household-borrowers,
similar to Asimakopoulos and Asimakopoulos (2017). Thus, housing demand
for household-borrowers increases as a result of the higher loans, as well as
the investment in human capital, leading to higher stock of human capi-
tal. Specifically, the increase in the stock of human capital for borrowers is
higher than that of the savers. This leads to higher increase in their wage
rate relative to savers and a lower skill premium as a consequence.
1.6.2 Shock to preference
We now turn to the case of a positive one standard deviation temporary shock
to households’preferences. Figure 1.2 shows that the shock to preferences has
asymmetric effects to the two types of households in the economy.21 Savers
will decrease their deposits so as to consume more and increase their stock
of housing. The decrease in deposits has a knock-on effect on loans supply
to borrowers, leading to lower stock of housing for household-borrowers and
entrepreneurs. Therefore, even though borrowers have a stronger preference
towards consumption and housing they are not able to satisfy it due to the
lower availability of funds. As a result, they will tend to increase their labour
supply so as to compensate for this loss. This leads to lower wage rate for
borrowers which is further pushed downwards from the lower investment and
time spent in human capital accumulation. Skill premium will widen under
this scenario and it will be further pushed upwards from the increased human
capital accumulation from the savers.
1.6.3 Shock to human capital transformation
In this subsection, we analyse the case of a positive one standard devia-
tion temporary shock to human capital transformation effi ciency. Figure 1.3
shows that the positive human capital transformation shock leads to a sym-
metric increase in human capital accumulation via investment in goods and
21In line with our results, Isore and Szczerbowicz (2017) show that preferences shock
creates more impatient households with respect to their consumption expenditures.
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time for both types of households. The initial financing of human capital
is driven from the lower consumption for both households. However, savers
decrease their deposits to further enhance their human capital accumulation
and housing stock. This leads to lower loans for borrowers, decreasing their
housing stock and driving up their labour supply. Therefore, borrowers’wage
rate decreases resulting in an increase of the skill premium.22
1.6.4 Shock to household-borrowers financial constraint
Next we examine the case of a positive one standard deviation temporary
shock to loan-to-value (LTV) ratio for household-borrowers. In particu-
lar, Figure 1.4 shows the effects of a relaxation of the financial friction for
household-borrowers. Under this shock they borrow more from banks to in-
vest in housing and human capital, similar to Liu et al. (2013) and Ravn
(2016). In our set-up they substitute away from labour to time in human
capital accumulation, due to the income effect, which will increase their wage
rate. The higher wage rate is also supported by an increase in their produc-
tivity. Deposits from savers initially increase to satisfy the higher supply of
funds from the banks but as the shock fades away deposits drop and so do
the loans. The reduction in the loans and the increase in housing prices drive
an increase in labour supply from borrowers which overturns the reduction
in wage and consumption inequalities observed in the short-run.
1.6.5 Shock to entrepreneurs financial constraint
In Figure 1.5 we examine a positive one standard deviation temporary shock
to loan-to-value ratio for entrepreneurs. We observe that this shock will
lead to higher loans for entrepreneurs which will be invested in real estate.23
Therefore, labour demand will decrease (due to the assumed standard Cobb-
Douglas production function) driving wage rates to decrease in the short-
22This result is similar to Dadgar and Trimble (2015) and Murphy and Topel (2016),
who show a higher wage inequality driven by the assumed endogenous human capital
accumulation, albeit at a different set-up.
23Gambacorta and Signoretti (2014) also find that under a positive borrowing constraint
shock borrowers become better off while the demand for housing and goods increases.
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run. Following the initial reaction, the wage rates for savers will tend to
increase faster compared to that of the borrowers, due to higher returns
from deposits that the savers partially invest in human capital. Household-
borrowers increase their time spent in human capital substituting away from
labour. However, this is not suffi cient to compensate the lower investment
of goods in human capital, driving their overall human capital to decrease.
As a result this shock will lead to a higher skill premium, and wage gap will
widen in the economy.
1.6.6 Welfare effects
In this section, we report the numerical solutions of aggregate welfare from
the various shocks presented above using the consumption equivalence ap-
proach.
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) present a loss function that could trans-
form households’objective function into a quadratic function by using first-
order approximation of the constraints, which delivers accurate results for
social planners. Benigno and Woodford (2012) developed this idea further by
assuming the general setting without the presence of subsidiaries. They also














where Xt is an N ×1 vector with the variables used in a model with their
deviation from the steady state. X´tWiXt is the quadratic approximation of
the households’utility function of U(Xt).
There is also a literature that describes the analytical approach of the
welfare aspects (see, for example, Ferrero et al., 2018 and Rubio and Yao,
2019), who derive the second-order approximation of the welfare function to
find consumption gap, output gap and housing gap.
Assuming that the welfare of each agent after the shock is given by W asi
and beforeW 0i , then the consumption equivalent gain/loss of each agent from
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where λi is the consumption equivalent gain/loss from the shock.
Using the logarithmic utility function applied in our analysis we get the












As a result, Table 1.5 presents the values of the consumption equivalent
in percentage terms for each agent (in columns) and for each shock (in rows).
Positive values indicate that the agent is better off under the shocks and vice
versa. Moreover, the values reported in Table 1.5 are for t→∞. Note that
Table 1.5 also includes the discounted percent deviation of the skill premium
from the steady state24, expressed as the ratio of the savers over the borrowers
wage rate, in the last column. This gives a quantitative indication regarding
the wage gap effects of each shock we discussed in the impulse responses
earlier.
Starting with the TFP shock, we observe that borrowers gain significantly
more, relative to the savers, due to their higher wage rates. This is mainly
driven by the increased loans to borrowers that are invested in both housing
and human capital accumulation. Moving to the preferences shock we observe
that savers are the only ones that marginally increase their welfare. This is
mainly due to the lower availability of funds for the borrowers, which also
has a negative effect on wage gap that increases at about 2%.
Interestingly, under the human capital effi ciency transformation shock,
household-borrowers will increase their consumption more relative to savers.
24As a discount factor, we have used the households-borrowers time discount factor for
the calculations shown in the tables. Even if we use the savers’discount factor the results
are qualitatively similar.
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However, the wage gap will widen at about 0.6% due to the shift of investment
from deposits to human capital accumulation from savers, leading to lower
available funds for the borrowers.
Under the positive financial shock to households’borrowing constraint
we observe that borrowers are better off compared to savers in terms of
welfare, even though there is a reduction in consumption gap only in the
short-run, as we discussed earlier in the impulse responses. Regarding wage
gap, we observe that skill premium increases at about 0.2% indicating that
the short-run reduction of wage gap after the shock is not suffi cient to reduce
wage gap in the long-run.
Finally, under the positive shock to the entrepreneurs’borrowing con-
straint we observe an increase in wage and consumption gaps both in the
short-run (see Figure 1.5) and in the long-run. Specifically, Table 1.5 indi-
cates that savers will be marginally better off in terms of welfare and wage
gaps will increase at about 1.2%. As it is expected, entrepreneurs will also be
better off, as well as banks, due to the higher supply of loans to entrepreneurs.
Table 1.5: Welfare and skill premium effects
HH-savers HH-borrowers Entrepr. Bank WH/W S
TFP 0.0210 0.2965 0.1977 0.3519 -13.2112
AC 0.0014 -0.0364 -0.0054 -0.0941 2.0524
B 0.0199 0.0556 0.0900 -0.0822 0.6347
AMS 0.0001 0.0028 0.0000 0.0340 0.2068
AME 0.0008 -0.0086 0.0166 0.2171 1.1856
1.7 Robustness check
1.7.1 Assessing the calibration of financial frictions
As a robustness check we change the parameters that enter the financial
frictions. These parameters affect the financial frictions of the borrowers
and the banks. In particular, in our experiments we decrease the capital-
asset ratio requirement for the banks, γ, the adjustment of the borrowing
constraints for the households and entrepreneurs, ρS and ρE, and the partial
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adjustment in bank capital, ρD.
Table 1.6 below compares the welfare results from these cases to the base
results presented earlier, as well as the effects on wage gap. We can see
that the adjustment parameters of the borrowing constraints do not affect
the results significantly. However, the capital-asset ratio requirement for the
banks, γ, appears to have a strong impact on wage and consumption gaps.
Specifically, under a TFP shock there is an increase of about 2% in wage gap
compared to the base case, if we relax the capital-asset ratio requirement.
In addition, consumption gap increases compared to the base case since bor-
rowers’consumption will not increase as much and savers’consumption mar-
ginally increases relative to the base case. Finally, under preferences and
human capital effi ciency shocks the capital-asset ratio requirement seems to
marginally reduce wage gap at about 0.5%.
Therefore, the decrease in capital-asset requirement will increase con-
sumption and wage gap under a TFP shock. This is due to the fact that
under a TFP shock the lower capital-asset ratio requirement will lead to a
reduction in the demand for deposits from the savers increasing their dispos-
able income that they could spend in human capital accumulation and/or
consumption. The reduction of wage gap under a positive preferences and
human capital transformation shocks is mainly driven from the fact that with
a lower γ the bank can increase its borrowing to household-borrowers that
can be spent in human capital accumulation.
1.7.2 Different modelling assumptions
In this section we assess the importance of the endogenous human capital
accumulation channel and the existence of banks. To that end we construct
three different models. In the first model we eliminate the endogenous hu-
man capital channel (model 1). In the second model we re-introduce the
endogenous human capital channel but we eliminate the banks (model 2).
In this model household-savers will provide the loans to borrowers and there
will be no capital adequacy constraint, leading to a faster supply of funds.
Finally, in the third model we eliminate both the endogenous human capital
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Table 1.6: Robustness checks for the welfare and skill premium effects
HH-savers HH-borrowers Entrepr. Bank WH/W S
TFP 0.0210 0.2965 0.1977 0.3519 -13.2112
AC 0.0014 -0.0364 -0.0054 -0.0941 2.0524
B Base 0.0199 0.0556 0.0900 -0.0822 0.6347
AMS 0.0001 0.0028 0.0000 0.0340 0.2068
AME 0.0008 -0.0086 0.0166 0.2171 1.1856
TFP 0.0214 0.2873 0.2002 0.3310 -13.7218
AC 0.0013 -0.0343 -0.0062 -0.0913 1.9076
B ρS= 0.8 0.0198 0.0567 0.0889 -0.0798 0.5762
AMS 0.0001 0.0027 -0.0001 0.0249 0.0619
AME 0.0008 -0.0079 0.0166 0.2366 1.1213
TFP 0.0216 0.2890 0.1780 0.3746 -12.9234
AC 0.0013 -0.0362 0.0007 -0.0919 1.8864
B ρE= 0.8 0.0199 0.0536 0.0972 -0.0933 0.7926
AMS 0.0001 0.0027 0.0002 0.0430 0.2083
AME 0.0004 -0.0083 0.0296 0.1052 1.0050
TFP 0.0234 0.2653 0.1668 0.1963 -11.2588
AC 0.0011 -0.0306 -0.0002 -0.0810 1.3376
B γ = 0.8 0.0198 0.0609 0.0916 -0.0712 0.0228
AMS 0.0001 0.0012 0.0003 0.0396 0.3223
AME 0.0003 -0.0107 0.0149 0.1699 1.2920
TFP 0.0208 0.3028 0.2025 0.2664 -13.3402
AC 0.0014 -0.0363 -0.0049 -0.0963 2.1181
B ρD= 0.8 0.0199 0.0569 0.0924 -0.1221 0.5519
AMS 0.0001 0.0027 -0.0005 0.0239 0.2261
AME 0.0011 -0.0082 0.0156 0.1448 1.1549
channel and banks (model 3).
Steady state analysis of the different models Before we show the im-
pulse responses of these models and perform an analysis on the wage gap
effects, we would like to mention that these models lead to a different steady
state (Table 1.7), similar to Iacoviello (2015) and Asimakopoulos and Asi-
makopoulos (2017) when they examine models with and without banks.
Specifically, Model 1 (without human capital) leads to a significantly
lower level of consumption, at about 80% lower than the benchmark case.
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Moreover, deposits and loans drop significantly. Hours worked decrease as
well at about 10%, leading to a decrease of about 84% in output compared to
the base case. Wage gap increases significantly, to about 66%, compared to
the base case and assets wage gap increases since housing is being reallocated
to savers. Therefore, cutting down the endogenous human capital channel
has significant steady-state effects in our model.
Moving to Model 2 (without banks), there is an increase in overall con-
sumption of about 5%, and housing is being re-allocated to borrowers due
to higher availability of funds from the elimination of the bank’s capital ad-
equacy constraint. In addition, output decreases, in contrast to Iacoviello
(2015), due to the decrease in human capital accumulation compared to the
base case.
Finally, Model 3 provides a combined outcome of Model 1 and 2 discussed
above.
Table 1.7: Steady state deviations from the benchmark model
Models
Variables w/o HC w/o Banks w/o HC and Banks
Cons. Banks −82.7103 − −
Entrepreneurs −84.7531 4.4040 −84.0324
HH-Savers −79.1676 0.1369 −79.1129
HH-Borrowers −81.5588 0.3419 −81.4386
Deposits −82.7103 − −
Housing Entrepreneurs −21.9664 15.3794 −8.9404
HH-Savers 6.6202 −5.9445 1.2379
HH-Borrowers −5.6180 13.4227 8.2691
Hours worked HH-Savers −16.5723 −0.5342 −16.9740
HH-Borrowers −10.4712 −0.6818 −11.1319
Wages HH-Savers 22.0011 0.05050 22.0634
HH-Borrowers −26.7822 0.2101 −26.5555
HC HH-Savers − −0.2656 −
HH-Borrowers − −0.2548 −
Output −84.7531 −0.3337 −84.7570
Loans HH-Borrowers −81.5588 21.3533 −77.5519
Entrepreneurs −84.7531 82.0035 −72.1644
Skill premium 66.6276 −0.1592 66.1982
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Impulse response and welfare analysis of the various models We
perform again the impulse response analysis for the three models under dif-
ferent assumptions and we plot them on the same graph. Figures 1.6 - 1.10
show the IRs of all the models and for every shock. The solid line is for
the benchmark model, the dashed line is for Model 1, the dotted line is for
Model 2, and the dashed-dotted line is for Model 3. We also provide Table
1.8 that presents the welfare and skill premium effects for each model under
each shock.
Figures 1.6-1.10 about here
Under the TFP shock we can see that the existence of human capital and
banks mitigates the reduction in wage gap mainly via two channels. On the
one hand, human capital allows both agents to improve productivity but the
savers can do so without the need to increase borrowing (see Figure 1.6).
On the other hand, the existence of banks and the relevant capital adequacy
constraint provide a friction in the availability of funds for the borrowers.
Therefore, those two features keep skill premium closer to the steady state.
Regarding consumption gap, we can see that consumption of both households
is mostly affected by the existence of the human capital channel.
Moving on to the preferences shock, Figure 1.7, we observe that both wage
and consumption gaps increase as we move from the base model to Models
1-3. Under this shock, savers can keep the same level of consumption, as
in the base case, by decreasing their level of deposit. Household-borrowers
increase their labour supply to be able to support their level of consumption
at the expense of receiving lower wage rates since there is no human capital
channel to invest in skills. Under the case without banks, savers benefit the
most since they now become the provider of loans, and are able to sustain
the same level of consumption, human capital accumulation and housing as
in the base case. Household-borrowers, however, reduce their human capital
investment so as to minimise the deviations of consumption and housing from
the base case, leading to higher wage gap.
Figure 1.8 compares the three models under the human capital trans-
formation effi ciency shock. Here we can only compare our base model with
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Model 2 that has human capital and no banks. We can see that the existence
of banks under a human capital shock is significant for the economy. First
of all, wage gap will rise considerably without banks since both agents will
increase their human capital at a similar rate but given the initial difference
in human capital, savers will keep and extend their comparative advantage.
Since borrowers’wage rate drops they try to increase their labour supply so
as to sustain their income level and be able to invest more in human capital.
In addition, consumption gap increases mainly due to the lower wage rate
for borrowers.
The positive shock to the financial constraint of household-borrowers,
Figure 1.9, indicates that the existence of human capital and banks leads
to a smoother reaction of skill premium (lower reduction compared to the
base case) and lower consumption gap. This is due to the fact that un-
der this shock household-borrowers increase their housing level, leading to
lower available stock of housing for the savers, given the assumed bounded
availability of housing stock. Their wealth increases substituting away from
labour supply and increasing their consumption. We should also note here
that there is a more pronounced effect on consumption gap under no banks
because of the frictionless transfer of funds from savers to borrowers.
Finally, under the financial shock to entrepreneurs, Figure 1.10, we ob-
serve that under no banks, entrepreneurs can increase their stock of real
estate considerably, due to the frictionless transfer of funds from savers (as
in the previous case), leading to higher future output level, similar to Asi-
makopoulos and Asimakopoulos (2017). This also results in higher consump-
tion and wage gaps because of the increased demand for the more productive
labour supply. The existence of human capital channel in this case does not
create significant deviations from the base model.
In terms of welfare we can see from Table 1.8 that household-savers will
always be marginally worse off or at a similar level with the base model.
However, household-borrowers will benefit the most when the human capital
accumulation channel is present and there is a frictionless flow of funds (no
banks). This is fairly intuitive since the endogenous human capital accumu-
lation channel can be more effective when agents can more easily draw more
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funds to invest on. Even though under no human capital but with frictionless
flow of funds (no banks) they can still benefit more, in terms of welfare, com-
pared to the base case. Thus, banks tend to mitigate the positive spillover
effects due to the assumed capital adequacy constraint. Entrepreneurs also
benefit the most under no banks but with human capital, even though they
will also benefit under the case without human capital and without banks.
Table 1.8: Welfare and skill premium effects of alternative model specifica-
tions
HH-savers HH-borrowers Entrepr. Bank WH/W S
TFP 0.0210 0.2965 0.1977 0.3519 -13.2112
AC 0.0014 -0.0364 -0.0054 -0.0941 2.0524
B Base 0.0199 0.0556 0.0900 -0.0822 0.6347
AMS 0.0001 0.0028 0.0000 0.0340 0.2068
AME 0.0008 -0.0086 0.0166 0.2171 1.1856
TFP 0.0135 0.2791 0.1614 0.3810 -23.8825
AC -0.0008 -0.0571 -0.0043 -0.0880 5.6511
B Model1 - - - - -
AMS 0.0000 0.0010 0.0000 0.0062 0.0339
AME 0.0008 -0.0099 0.0164 0.1856 2.2923
TFP 0.0180 0.3475 0.2625 - -15.5372
AC 0.0018 -0.0443 -0.0200 - 3.4257
B Model2 0.0200 0.0509 0.0796 - 1.5887
AMS 0.0002 0.0044 -0.0006 - 0.0993
AME 0.0020 -0.0060 0.0213 - 1.1260
TFP 0.0107 0.3326 0.2293 - -27.0161
AC -0.0004 -0.0653 -0.0186 - 8.6951
B Model3 - - - - -
AMS 0.0001 0.0051 -0.0007 - -0.2711
AME 0.0016 -0.0075 0.0203 - 1.7873
1.8 Conclusion
This chapter presents an empirical analysis of wage and welfare gaps in a
DSGE model with heterogeneous agents, financial frictions and endogenous
human capital accumulation. We initially calibrated our model for the U.S.
economy using quarterly data for the period 1965-2015 to match first and
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second moments of the key variables.
We found that under productivity shocks, wage and income gaps are
reduced significantly, whereas under preferences or financial shocks, wage
gap increased both in terms of welfare and wage rates. Finally, under a
human capital productivity shock we find that the welfare gap was reduced
both in the short-run and in the long-run. However, wage gap was reduced
only in the short-run, leading to higher wage gap in the long-run.
The robustness checks regarding the calibration of the financial frictions
indicated that the key results remained unaffected. However, the reduction
in capital-asset requirement for banks could lead to higher wage and con-
sumption gap in the long-run, compared to the benchmark model.
Finally, we assessed the effect of the key modelling assumptions, and our
findings suggested that the existence of solvent banks and their associated
capital adequacy constraint can mitigate the propagation of the shocks to
wage and consumption gaps. However, we also find that any lending facil-
ities are beneficial for household-borrowers, even though the presence of a
banking sector as long as household-savers can represent lenders. In addi-
tion, the human capital accumulation channel mainly improved the welfare
of household-borrowers and it significantly affected wage gap. Moreover,
savers’welfare remained at a similar level as the benchmark model under
all the shocks and the different models that we analysed. Therefore, our re-
sults indicated that policymakers need to foster human capital accumulation
to effi ciently control welfare gap, but also need to tightly regulate banks’
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0 = −λSt + µSt + EtβSλSt+1RS,t − EtβSµSt+1ρS (A10)
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0 = −λBt − µBt + EtβBλBt+1RH,t − EtβBµBt+1ρD (A17)
0 = λBt + µ
B
t − µBt (1− γ)(1− ρD)− EtβBλBt+1RE,t+1 − EtβBµBt+1ρD (A18)
0 = λBt + µ
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0 = −λEt + µEt + EtβEλEt+1RE,t+1 − EtβEλEt+1ρE (A21)












(1− υ) (1− σ)Yt
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−WS,tHCS,t−1(1 + µEt (1− ρE)AME,tmN) (A25)
A.4 Market clearing condition for housing
HH,t +HS,t +HE,t = 1 (A26)
A.5 Shocks
log(Zt) = ρZ log(Zt−1) + uZ (A27)
log(AME,t) = ρAME log(AME,t−1) + uME (A28)
log(AMS,t) = ρAMS log(AMS,t−1) + uMS (A29)
log(AC,t) = ρC log(AC,t−1) + uC (A30)





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 2: Economic gaps under banking
competition
2.1 Introduction
The past financial crisis shows the important role of the banking sector in
creating and propagating financial shocks. Researchers investigate this im-
portant issue by simulating dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models (Dib, 2010; Gerali et al., 2010; Iacoviello, 2015). Some DSGE models
include a banking sector, banks are presented in a perfectly competitive mar-
ket rather than in a monopolistic market. The World Bank Report states
that banking competition is vital for economic effi ciency and for the highest
social welfare25, while the Bank of England’s views are that the greater the
banking competition the better the service banks provide to customers.
This chapter aims to fill this gap by presenting a DSGEmodel with imper-
fectly competitive banks as in Gerali et al. (2010). As in the first chapter, we
introduce a human capital accumulation channel built on Jones et al. (1993),
which allows households to endogenously accumulate human capital through
investment and time devoted, and, thus boost productivity and wages. The
contribution of this study is to analyse how wage and wealth gaps between
heterogeneous workers is affected by imperfect banking competition and a
human capital accumulation channel. Existence of imperfect banking com-
petition allows households to choose between banks for higher gains in terms
of consumption, housing and investment in human capital. In Chapter 1,
we have found that banks mitigate the effects of financial shocks on wage
gap. However, does this remain true when an imperfect banking sector is
considered instead of perfect competition?
Literature on banking presents models with imperfect competition in fi-
nancial markets, where banks offer different interest rates on loans and de-
posits to attract clients. Moreover, banking competition helps investigate
economic volatility under imperfections in the banking sector (see Claessen,
25The World Bank Global Financial Development Report 2017/2018: Bankers without
Borders
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2009; Andres and Arce, 2012).
In this research we analyse both the demand and supply sides of the
credit market. Perfect banking competition adjusts to credit demand, while
neglecting the supply side. Market power, on the other hand, is determined
by bank capital and setting interest rates on loans and deposits. Bank capital
regulations are important as they are the main drivers for continuous loan
supply and changing costs of loans (i.e. de Walque et al., 2010). Therefore,
banks use their profit to increase their capital and loan supply. Stronger bank
capital regulations also support the economy’s resistance to various shocks.
With greater loan supply, borrowers can boost consumption and, thus,
output. However, loose constraints negatively affect human capital, since
household-borrowers borrow and spend on their consumption rather than on
human capital.
Inclusion of a human capital channel is vital, as it allows households
to endogenously accumulate their human capital through attending short-
term training. This gives impatient households a chance to compete in the
labour market, as they are less skilled (see, for example, Goldin and Katz,
2008; Piketty and Saez, 2014). Thus, higher productivity results in higher
economic development and explains the wage distribution among households.
OECD (2015) study shows that lower the skills workers have, the greater
the income gap, which results in less investment in human capital and less
time spent training. Low-skilled workers have to devote most of their time
to work instead of spending time in the human capital accumulation process.
Therefore, they will always be worse off than their high-skilled peers. Thus,
it is important to analyse the roles of both inputs in accumulating human
capital, as it is presented in this chapter.
We use quarterly data to analyse both financial shocks and the human
capital accumulation, following Dadgar and Trimble (2015). They investigate
short-term and long-term credentials, which increase every quarter. Their
findings suggest that quarterly skill improvements lead to positive changes
in workers’income. It is vital to study these changes on a smaller basis than
yearly, to understand how accumulated skills affect deviations in wage gap
between heterogeneous households. This also helps to study the effects of
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quarterly basis shocks on human capital.
Therefore, this work aims to answer the following questions: i) can human
capital reduce the wage and wealth gaps under various shocks; ii) how does
imperfect competition affect households’preferences for consumption, hous-
ing and human capital; iii) how do borrowing and saving decisions change
under the presence of monopolistic banking competition; iv) does the finding
of the first chapter stay consistent under new banking assumptions.
The findings show that with the presence of an endogenous human cap-
ital accumulation channel, wage gap increases under a housing preference
and human capital shocks. Interestingly, a human capital transformation
shock provides only a temporary decline in wage gap, while it widens in the
long-run. Furthermore, wage gap decreases under a total factor productivity
(TFP) and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio shocks. These results are consistent
with the outcomes of the first chapter.
Robustness checks show that with the different modelling assumptions
the results of the model stay consistent. However, lower loans elasticity of
substitutions provide greater steady state deviations and the largest wage
gap among all modelling assumptions.
The rest of the chapter is as follows: Section 2.2 revises the literature
review in banking, while the literature on human capital accumulation was
extensively discussed in Chapter 1. Section 2.3 describes the model set-up of
the current chapter. Section 2.4 presents the decentralised competitive equi-
librium. The calibration, steady states and stochastic processes are discussed
in Section 2.5. Impulse response analysis and welfare effects are given in Sec-
tion 2.6, whereas the robustness check is presented in Section 2.7. Finally,
conclusion is discussed in Section 2.8.
2.2 Related literature
As intermediaries between savers and borrowers, banks propagate and am-
plify financial shocks to the real economy. The literature dedicated to DSGE
models has included banks decades ago, however, the significant realisation
of the importance of including banks in models came after the financial cri-
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sis. This inclusion allows us to analyse financial frictions and destructions in
shock propagation.
One of the earliest papers in this area is by Bernanke et al. (1999), which
indicates the vital role of a banking system and its inclusion in DSGEmodels.
They show that agents’ decisions of whether to repay loans back or not
can create considerable destructions in various banking activities. This also
leads to bank defaults on contract obligations to depositors, which can cause
further damages, and defaults in financial markets. While these situations are
grounds for runs and shortages in loan supply, they also generate instability
and insolvency of banks.
Following Bernanke et al. (1999), papers such as Meh and Moran (2004),
Curdia and Woodford (2009) and Iacoviello (2015) also empirically prove the
importance of including a banking sector in DSGE models. However, these
papers investigate the demand side of the credit market, while the supply
side of it is neglected. Thus, these papers present banks that operate under
a perfect competition.
The models of banking in DSGE models’ literature assume a represen-
tative bank that is solvent and homogeneous. This bank does not bank-
rupt while performing in the market with a perfect competition. Unlike
these studies, our assumption follows the other side of the banking literature
where banks differ in terms of their main two operations (loan and deposit
contracts) and setting interest rates. These heterogeneous banks can default
on their obligations and bankrupt. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the
both sides of a credit market, where financial market can be imperfect in
terms of loan supply.
Salop (1979) is among the firsts to show a monopolistic competition
within industries, and whose location model is widely used in banking. The
Smith (1998) paper demonstrates a heterogeneous loan market whereas this
market is not centralised. The economic activity improves when there is
a healthy competition between banks. However, an imperfect competition
might lead to severe macroeconomic consequences by affecting output and
creating larger cyclical fluctuations. Smith’s (1998) findings show that macro-
economic costs are mainly associated with banking regulations. Moreover,
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these regulations depress the competition among banks while reducing the
number of operating banks.
Goodhart et al. (2005) state that bank operations are risky by definition.
Questioning the interactions between banks in an interbank market helps to
measure the risks these banks can take to be potentially able to disturb an
economy. For these reasons, an interbank market and heterogeneous banks
shall be taken into consideration in models. Additionally, according to Good-
hart et al. (2006) identical or homogenous banks cannot default because they
hedge against bankruptcies. This constrains researchers in finding out how
shocks are created within a credit supply side.
Therefore, loan market imperfections and financial institutions’activities
can create the environment for financial shocks, as the recent financial crisis
has shown. These imperfections in credit markets explain the existence of
heavy banking regulation policies by authorities as banks are loan generators
in an economy. It also sheds light on central banks’immediate reaction to
any volatility in a financial sector.
de Walque et al. (2010) extend the Goodhart et al. (2006) model by
including heterogeneous banks that are regulated by authorities and enjoy
liquidity injections. Their paper includes regulations for a bank capital and a
supervisory authority in an interbank market for liquidity injection purposes.
They provide the evidence for the importance of a bank capital. However,
they state that this capital is rather endogenous than exogenous. Thus,
banks do not consume their profit fully, instead they partially invest it into
their capital in order to increase the volume of issuing loans. Moreover, bank
capital can also prevent a bank from any bank failure.
Therefore, bank capital regulations help financial institutions and economies
to be more resistant to shocks, although it suppresses output growth in the
long-term. Injections, which are used to stabilise and improve the liquid-
ity, can positively influence an economy while stimulating the progress and
financial stability. However, the outcomes of these stimulations fade away
quickly, and only appear to be successful in the short-run.
The importance of various bank capital levels across different banks (i.e.
size) and the competition among them are also presented by the Gerali et al.
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(2010) paper. Bank capital affects the quality and the cost of loans banks can
potentially issue to borrowers. Therefore, the authors look at the supply side
of a loan market, claiming that there are also shocks to interest rates of both
deposits and loans, and to bank capital. With the presence of a monopolistic
competition across banks, the banking sector can significantly attenuate the
output under TFP and monetary shocks. This relaxes the effects of these
shocks on both consumption and investment.
Gerali et al. (2010) have also found that in the Euro area, costs of loans
have been the main driver of financial shocks during the last financial crisis.
Under the presence of a financial crunch, bank capital shrinks, which causes
further loan supply instability. Without suffi cient loan availability, firms and
entrepreneurs will struggle to enlarge their production and invest in current
and new projects. The decline in the production will affect the employment
rate, thus, reducing the working hours and wages of households. This ex-
plains why financial shocks negatively affect real variables, such as output,
consumption and investment.
Andres and Arce (2012) also demonstrate an imperfect competition in a
credit market, whereas there is a perfect competition in a deposit market.
They also assume an endogenous spread in interest rates. They stress the idea
of a stronger banking competition, where there will be a greater output in the
long-run. To attract more borrowers, banks might charge lower interests on
loans, which increases the volume of loan supply and demand. Consequently,
housing, that impatient households can afford to purchase on a mortgage, will
go up. Moreover, loan availability improves aggregate investment by firms,
which increases output and consumption. However, real variables are more
volatile in the short-run.
Schliephake and Kirstein (2013) research capital regulations in the bank-
ing sector. Their findings suggest that with higher capital requirements
banking lending will drop. However, their empirical test shows that these
requirements lead to higher loan costs, which increases bank profit. This can
stabilise the economy by eliminating risky activities by banks, however, a
reduction of the competition in the market will lead to declined loan sup-
ply. Moreover, Egan et al. (2017) also investigate banking competition, the
75
supply side of a credit market and regulations in deposit markets. They
find that stricter capital and deposit regulations eliminate severe outcomes
of financial destructions. On the other hand, harsher capital regulations and
requirements can lead to stability in the market, but remove the welfare.
Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2017) also show the importance of capital
regulations, which can decrease excessive credit growth by raising capital re-
quirements for banks. They discuss the channels that can reduce welfare, and
that there is a welfare trade-off that appears between savers and borrowers.
Similar to our analyses, borrowers are generally worse off, and savers better
offdue to their savings. Banks are affected negatively in this scenario as with
higher capital requirements they produce less credits that reduce their profit
initially. However, these requirements stabilise financial sectors that make
borrowers and banks better off eventually.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse wage gap under the presence
of both human capital accumulation channel and imperfect banking compe-
tition. Thus, in this current research we combine two streams in one single
model. It is known that savers and borrowers are affected by different shocks
including financial. But, as we mentioned previously, these studies do not
analyse the effects of both imperfect banking sector and human capital ac-
cumulation.
There are several reasons that explain the importance of human capital.
Firstly, it allows households to accumulate new skills by attending on- and
off-job training. Secondly, this gives households a chance to affect their
own productivity through endogenously accumulating human capital. Lastly,
with greater human capital, households can be more competitive in a labour
market, and their wages will be higher.
In our model we introduce two types of households: household-savers and
household-borrowers. They differ in preferences in their current and future
consumption and savings. These households also differ in terms of wage rates,
which comes from the differences in skills and productivity. This widens wage
gap between two households. Moreover, with human capital accumulation
channel, households can decide how much time and final goods they are
willing to invest in their skills in order to improve their human capital and
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productivity. Along with this, households need to decide on working hours,
expenditure on consumption and housing. Household-savers are more skilled
whereas household-borrowers are less skilled. Moreover, household-borrowers
are more impatient, which explains why these agents tend to borrow. Human
capital in this modelling set-up can also be assumed as human wealth.
2.3 Model outline
Here we introduce a model of a closed economy presented by two different
types of households who have different human capital levels, entrepreneurs
who produce wholesale goods, capital and final goods producers, and banks
who compete in an imperfect market. The initial model is based on the
model of the Iacoviello (2015) and Gerali et al. (2010) papers. Moreover, the
current model is the extension of the model in Chapter 1. We extend it by
replacing a solvent banking sector with an imperfect banking competition.
Therefore, each j bank holds a degree of monopolistic power in terms of
deposits and loans in these markets. Furthermore, we include capital and
final goods producers in the model. These producers, as well as imperfect
competition in the banking sector, are built on the Gerali et al. (2010) paper.
We assume that there are two types of households: household-savers and
household-borrowers. They differ in terms of their time preference, which
leads to differences in their wealth, wages and human capital. Thus, they
have different levels of productivity, which creates a wage gap. A human
capital accumulation channel is introduced following the Jones et al. (1993)
paper. Entrepreneurs in the model produce wholesale goods by using capital
stock and labour provided by households. Both entrepreneurs and household-
borrowers borrow from banks to increase their expenses on consumption,
housing or capital stock. Household-borrowers also invest in human capital
in order to be more competitive in a labour market and earn higher wages.
As stated earlier, there are also capital and final goods producers. Producers
of capital operate in a perfectly competitive market, while goods retailers
operate in a monopolistic market.
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2.3.1 Households
There are two types of representative households: household-savers and
household-borrowers, similar to patient and impatient households in Gerali
et al. (2010). Both households own houses, but differ in wealth. Households
also hold human capital, which is higher for savers as they are more patient
and productive than household-borrowers. This difference in time preference
causes wage gap between these two agents. Both households maximise their
utility and are subject to budget constraints. In the utility, both agents are
subject to a consumption habit coeffi cient aH . Both households are able to
affect their productivity and enjoy a human capital transformation shock.
Household-savers Each representative household-saver decides between
consumption CH,t, housing HH,t, time they devote for work NH,t and for












where βtH is a household-saver’s discount factor (0 < β
t
H < 1) .
26 Saver’s
consumption is presented in the utility as a current and lagged aggregate
consumption. j shows the share of the housing preference. Labour is pre-
sented by a disutility of worked hours with an elasticity of labour supply φ.
εH,t is a housing preference shock.
A household-saver is subject to the following budget constraint:
CH,t + I
ED
H,t + dH,t + qH,t (HH,t −HH,t−1)




At a period t a saver makes spending on consumption, new housing and
investment in human capital IEDH,t . She also holds deposit contracts of dH,t
26See Samuelson (1937) and Laibson (1997) for further reference to the households’
time preference.
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in retail banks. Housing price equals to qH,t, which is the same across all
households. (1 +RD,t−1) dH,t−1 are the gross payments the saver is paid by a
bank for holding deposit contracts, where RD,t are the net interest payments.
The agent is also paid WH,t wages for NH,t worked hours and according to
the current human capital HCH,t she has already obtained. As an owner of
banks and firms, a saver is paid JR
γH
dividends by firms and banks.
Human capital accumulation channel We assume that a household-
saver is able to endogenously accumulate new skills by attending extra train-
ing. This allows the agent to increase the returns on investment in human
capital as s/he becomes more productive and earns higher wages. The human
capital accumulation channel follows the Jones et al. (1993) paper:









A household-saver invests IEDH,t in human capital whereas θ shows the im-
portance of goods input in the human capital accumulation process, while
χ shows the returns to scale. Bt is a shock to the production of new skills
or a human capital transformation shock. Human capital is also subject to
depreciation δSK . Thus, household-savers need to continuously improve their
human capital to increase their productivity level over time.
Household-borrowers Each representative household-borrower owns hous-
ing and borrows to increase consumption, to purchase new housing and to
invest in human capital. Thus, household-borrower is willing to increase hu-
man capital if returns from it are higher. At period t a household-borrower
maximises her utility, which is similar to the one for savers, by choosing be-
tween consumption CS,t, housing HS,t and time at work NS,t and in human
















savers are more patient than household-borrowers.
A household-borrower is subject to the budget constraint:
CS,t + I
ED
S,t + qH,t (HS,t −HS,t−1) + (1 +RS,t−1) lS,t−1
= lS,t +WS,tHCS,t−1NS,t
(30)
A household-borrower invests IEDS,t in human capital and borrows lS,t
amount of funds from banks for the cost of net interest RS,t. WS,t is the
wage, which is paid for NS,t worked hours and HCS,t human capital the
agent has obtained.
As household-borrowers borrow from banks they are subject to the bor-
rowing constraint. Therefore, they cannot borrow more than the value of
their collateral, i.e. houses, to cover both the loan amount and the interests
on it:
(1 +RS,t) lS,t ≤ mS,tqH,t+1HS,t (31)
where mS,t is an exogenous shock, which affects households’borrowing abil-
ities or a loan-to-value ratio shock. If this shock is positive, then household-
borrowers can borrow more for the same value of their collateral.
Human capital accumulation channel Similar to household-savers,
household-borrowers accumulate human capital, which improves their wage
rates as it affects their productivity, and helps them compete with savers in
a labour market:











Entrepreneurs produce wholesale goods by using their capital stock and




βtE(1− aE) log (CE,t − aECE,t−1) (33)
where βtE is the entrepreneurs’discount factor and CE,t is their consumption
at period t with a lagged consumption parameterised by a habit coeffi cient
aE.
Their production function Y Wt is the Cobb-Douglas type, which is given
by:
Y Wt = Zt (utKE,t−1)
α [LυHDL1−υSD ](1−α) (34)
where, for simplicity, LHD = HCH,t−1NH,t and LSD = HCS,t−1NS,t. Zt is
a total factor productivity shock. ut is a utilisation rate. α is the share
of capital stock in the production function and υ is the share of household-
savers.
Entrepreneurs are subject to the budget constraint:
CE,t + qK,t (KE,t − (1− δK)KE,t−1) + (1 +RE,t−1) lE,t−1





They borrow lE,t loans from banks and pay RE net interest payments on
them. Entrepreneurs own capital presented by KE,t, which depreciates at δK
rate. Utilisation rate ut is associated with a setting of a real cost Λ(ut) =
ξ1(ut − 1) +
ξ2
2
(ut − 1)2, where ξ1 > 0 and ξ2 > 0 .27 This means that we
allow entrepreneurs to be able to control a utilisation rate of their capital
stock. Moreover, with a utilisation cost a depreciation rate of capital stock
should take higher value. 1
Xt
is a relative competitive price level of wholesale
27Λ(ut) is presented as in the Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006) paper.
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goods. Therefore, the Λ(ut)KE,t is a cost of utilising capital stock. To be
able to borrow from banks, the fraction of entrepreneurs’capital should be
more than a value of a loan. Therefore, entrepreneurs are restricted by the
value of their collateral:
(1 +RE,t) lE,t ≤ qK,t+1(1− δK)KE,t (36)
2.3.3 Demand for loans and deposits
Demand functions of borrowers’ loans and savers’deposits are given using
the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) demand functions.
Demand for household-borrowers and entrepreneurs loans There
are continuum of j-s banks in an economy as well as i-s number of households
and entrepreneurs. The aggregate demand for loans by household-borrowers







where RS,t(j) is an interest rate for loans charged by a j bank. εBS,t is the
elasticity of substitution and εBS,t > 1. lS,t are aggregate loans to household-
borrowers.








where εBE,t is the elasticity of substitution and εBE,t > 1. lE,t are aggregate
loans to entrepreneurs.
Demand for household-savers deposits The aggregate demand for household-








where εBD,t is the elasticity of substitution and εBD,t < −1. dt represents
aggregate deposits in an economy.
The elasticities of substitution presented above play a crucial role in de-
termining the interest rate spreads, which are derived in the next section.
Here we present the elasticities of substitution for loans and deposits. The
values are given to differentiate two different types of financial products: loan
and deposit contracts. We assume that these elasticities are stochastic per-
manent shocks. Their effects on interest rate spreads are separate from those
of the monetary policy.
These elasticities show the market power. The higher the market power
for setting interest rates the lower the elasticities.
2.3.4 Banks
As mentioned earlier, the banking sector of this model closely follows the
paper by Gerali et al. (2010). There are three types of branches of each j
bank: a wholesale branch and two retail banks. A wholesale bank operates
under a perfect competition. It is also in charge of bank capital among all
three branches. Thus, it accumulates aggregate deposits from one retail bank
and, while combining it with bank capital, issues aggregate loans to another
retail bank. Retail banks, one of which issues loans to borrowers while the
other one collects deposits from savers, operate under a monopoly.
Wholesale branch A wholesale bank accumulates bank capital as follows:
KB,t = (1− δB)KB,t−1 + jB,t−1 (40)
where KB,t is the total bank capital, δB represents all resources used to
manage bank capital and jB,t shows total profits, which are made by three
branches.


















where βtB is a banks’ discount factor, LB,t are wholesale loans, DB,t are
wholesale deposits, RBL,t is a net wholesale loan rate, R
B
D,t is a net wholesale
deposit rate, which equals to the policy rate Rt by arbitrage. κKB is an
adjustment parameter and KB,t
LB,t
is a capital-to-asset ratio whereas νB is its
target level.
Wholesale banks are subject to a balance-sheet constraint:
LB,t = DB,t +KB,t (42)
To see the spread on interest rates in the wholesale side we find a first
order condition, which is given by the following:










thus, taking into account this FOC and RBD,t = Rt (as banks have unlimited
access to funds from central banks) we get a spread for wholesale banks:
SWt = R
B










From the given spread condition, it is seen that if wholesale banks decide
to increase interest rates to get higher interest payments, then marginal costs
have to change too.
Retail branch There are two retail banks in the model. Both retail
branches operate under monopolistic competition in loans and deposits mar-
kets. The first bank issues loans to household-borrowers and entrepreneurs
while the second one offers deposit contracts to household-savers.
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Loans branch Loan branches issue loans to borrowers. They obtain
wholesale loans from wholesale banks at a cost of RBL,t, differentiate and












The maximisation problem is subject to the loan demand functions of two
borrowers (Equation 37 and 38). It is also subject to Lt(j) = LS,t(j)+LE,t(j)
by definition.
A first order condition with respect to interest rates on loans to household-
borrowers and entrepreneurs are given as follows:




Log-linearising and rearranging this FOC gives us the condition for the
interest rate on loans, which depends on the expected mark-up shocks’values
and expected values of wholesale interest rates in the next periods as well
as the marginal costs. When assuming the flexible interest rates we get the
following spread between a loan interest rate and policy rate:











L,t. The spread of the retail loans
shows that it increases with the rise in the policy rate and is also proportional
to the wholesale spread. Moreover, the greater the monopolistic power the
wider the retail spread for loans.
Deposits branch A deposit branch accumulates deposits of savers
by offering them deposit contracts, which further transferred to a wholesale









This function is subject to Dt(j) = dH,t(j) and to the deposit demand
function (Equation 39). We find a first order condition with respect to deposit
interest rate as follows:




Bank profit The total bank profit consists of the profits made by a whole-













There are firms, owned by entrepreneurs, which operate under a perfect
competition. These firms purchase capital from their owners at a price of
QK,t. This capital stock has been undepreciated in the last period. They
also buy final goods from retail firms, It units of which at Pt retail price.
Therefore, taking into account inputs, these firms’flow is the following:
∆Kt = Kt − (1− δK)Kt−1 (51)
Equation 51 improves the effective capital stockKt, which these firms sell
back to entrepreneurs at price of QK,t, where qK,t =
QK,t
Pt
is its real price. Kt
is an aggregate capital stock. We assume that in steady state capital price
is unity.












Kt = Kt−1 + It (53)
2.3.6 Retailers
Following Bernanke et al. (1999) retailers of final goods operate in a monop-
olistic market. The prices for the final goods are subject to price stickiness
following Calvo (1983). Therefore, retailers choose price {Pt (j)} to maximise









where βtR is the retailers’discount factor.
28







where εY,t is a price elasticity of demand.
2.3.7 Aggregate resource constraint
As it is assumed all goods produced in the economy should be consumed,
thus, consumption, investment in human capital, bank capital and adjust-
ment costs cannot exceed current production. This is shown in the standard
aggregate resource constraint:
Yt = Ct + qK,t (Kt − (1− δK)Kt−1) + Λ(ut)KE,t−1 + IEDt + δBKB,t−1 (56)
where the total consumption:
28As households-savers own banks and retail firms, there is a βtH discount factor to
assess savers’future profit. Therefore, a discount factor is the same across these agents.
As entrepreneurs are owners of the capital producers, the latter will have the same
discount factor as entrepreneurs.
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Ct = CH,t + CS,t + CE,t (57)






For simplicity the housing in the model is normalised to unity as in Ia-
coviello (2015):
Ht = HS,t +HH,t = 1 (59)
2.3.8 Shocks
There are four shocks in the model: a TFP shock, a shock to household-
borrowers’borrowing constraint, a shock to human capital transformation
and a shock to housing preference. These exogenous shocks follow AR(I)
process:
log εH,t = (1− ρεH )ε
ss
H + ρεH log εH,t−1 + uH (60)
logZt = (1− ρZ)Zss + ρZ logZt−1 + uZ (61)
logBt = (1− ρB)Bss + ρB logBt−1 + uB (62)
logmS,t = (1− ρMS)mssS + ρMS logmS,t−1 + uMS (63)
There are also shocks in the banking side of the model, which do not follow
an AR(I) process. We present these shocks as permanent shocks, which are
explained in the following sections.
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2.4 Decentralised competitive equilibrium
The decentralised competitive equilibrium is presented by a series of alloca-
tions {CH,t, CS,t, CE,t, HH,t, HS,t, KE,t, KB,t, NH,t, NS,t, NEDH,t , NEDS,t , IEDH,t ,
IEDS,t , HCH,t, HCS,t, dH,t, lS,t, lE,t, Y
W
t , Yt}∞t=0 and prices {WH,t, WS,t, RD,t,
RS,t, RE,t, RV,t, qH,t, qK,t}∞t=0 so that agents will maximise their profits.
The DCE equations are given in Appendix B.
2.5 Calibration and steady state
This section provides the relevant calibration of the model. For the calibra-
tion we have used the U.S. quarterly data for the period of 1965Q1-2016Q429
to match the steady states with the great ratios.
On the households’ side, we set a consumption habit coeffi cient aH to
be 0.867 following Gerali et al. (2010). Housing preference share j is set to
equal 0.1 to match household-borrowers’loans-to-output ratio of 0.68.30 The
elasticity of labour supply φ in the labour disutility equals to 1, following
the Gerali et al. (2010) paper. Discount factors of household-savers βH
and household-borrowers βS are set to 0.9943 and 0.94 respectively, as in
Iacoviello (2015).
There is a share of the firms’and banks’profit γH , that household-savers
receive as dividends. This parameter γH equals to 1 as in the Gerali et al.
(2010) paper.
On both households’human capital accumulation side we have three pa-
rameters: human capital depreciation δSK , goods’ inputs importance θ in
accumulating human capital, and returns to scale χ. θ is set to equal 0.7 to
match the investment in human capital over output ratio of 2.11 that is close
to the data of the private investment in skills-to-output.31 χ is set to be 0.35
29U.S. quarterly data for 1965Q1 -2016Q4 has been hp-filtered and log-transformed.
30The quarterly U.S. data for the output for the period of 1965Q1-2016Q4 is obtained
from the NIPA tables. The quarterly U.S. data for the households’loans for the 1965Q1-
2016Q4 is taken from the Flow of Funds Accounts, as it is given in Iacoviello (2015)
31Private investment in education is a yearly U.S. data for 2007, 2008, 2011, 2012 and
2013, which is obtained from the Digest of Education Statistics
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to match the consumption-to-output ratio of 0.66.32 Following Jones et al.
(1993), we set human capital depreciation rate δSK at 0.1 to match the skill
premium of 1.79.
On the entrepreneurs’side, we start with the production function. The
share of entrepreneurs’capital stock α in the production is set to be 0.33.
Household-savers’labour share υ in the production process equals to 0.68.
These two parameters are set in order to match wages-to-output ratio to be
equal to 0.45 and the entrepreneurs’loans-to-output ratio of 0.38.33
The depreciation rate of capital stock δK equals to 0.03. The reason to
have a higher value than the standard one is stated by Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2006). Higher δK is associated with the inclusion of the utilisation cost
in the production function. Capital depreciation rate ensures the investment-
to-output ratio of 0.16.34
Parameters of capacity utilisation costs ξ1 and ξ2 are given following
Gerali et al. (2010).35
On the banking sector side, we have calibrated the parameter for the cost
of managing bank capital δB to be 0.1659 for the capital-to-asset ratio νB to
be 0.09, similar to Gerali et al. (2010). Adjustment parameter κKB in the
wholesale banks’utility equals to 5. This parameter gives the deposits-to-
output ratio of 0.40.36
The steady state values of the stochastic processes are normalised to unity
εH = Z = B = mS = 1.
The calibration of the parameters is presented in Table 2.1. In Table
2.2 we compare the averages of the U.S. quarterly data for the period of
1965Q1-2016Q4 with the steady states obtained from the model.
32Households consumption is a quarterly U.S. data for 1965Q1-2016Q4, which is taken
form the NIPA tables.
33The quarterly U.S. data for households’wages and entrepreneurs loans for the pe-
riod of 1965Q1-2016Q4 is obtained from the NIPA tables and Flow of Funds Accounts,
respectively.
34The quarterly data for the private fixed non-residential investment for the period of
1999Q1-2016Q4 is obtained from the NIPA tables.















Parameter Definition Value Source
βB Banks discount factor 0.9925 Iacoviello (2015)
βE Entrepreneurs discount factor 0.94 Iacoviello (2015)
βH HH-S discount factor 0.9925 Iacoviello (2015)
βS HH-B discount factor 0.94 Iacoviello (2015)
βK Capital producers discount factor 0.94 Iacoviello (2015)
βR Retailers discount factor 0.9925 Iacoviello (2015)
j Housing preference share 0.1 Data
φ Elasticity of labour supply 1 Gerali et al. (2010)
aH Consumption habit 0.867 Gerali et al. (2010)
γH Firms’and banks’profit share 1 Gerali et al. (2010)
α Share of capital stock in prod. 0.3 Data
υ HH-S labour share in prod. 0.647 Data
δK Capital depreciation 0.035 Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006)
ξ1 Capacity utilisation costs 0.0912 Gerali et al. (2010)
ξ2 Capacity utilisation costs 0.0091 Gerali et al. (2010)
δB Managing a bank capital cost 0.1049 Gerali et al. (2010)
κKB Adjustment parameter 5 Data
νB Target of capital-to-asset ratio 0.09 Data
θ Goods share in the HCA 0.7 Data
χ Returns to scale in HCA 0.35 Data
δSK HC depreciation rate 0.1 Jones et al . (1993)
2.5.1 Stochastic processes of the model
We calibrate the parameters of autocorrelations and standard deviations of
the AR(I) processes to match autocorrelations and standard deviations of
the data moments. Table 2.3 shows the values for these parameters, whereas
Table 2.4 shows the moments for the data and the model.
We set the autocorrelation ρZ and standard deviation σZ of the TFP
shock 0.86 and 0.004, respectively, to find the standard deviation and auto-
correlation of output in the model to be 0.014 and 0.76, respectively.
Autocorrelation ρmS and standard deviation σmS parameters for the LTV
ratio shock of household-borrowers are 0.9 and 0.0003, respectively. The
parameters of this shock ensure the standard deviation and autocorrelation
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of household-borrowers’loans-to-output to be closer to the data moments.
Autocorrelation ρB and standard deviation σB for the human capital
transformation shock equal to 0.65 and 0.008, respectively. The parameters
of this shock give the autocorrelation and standard deviation of the wages-
to-output ratio similar to the data moments.
We set autocorrelation ρεH and standard deviation σεH for housing pref-
erence shock to be 0.8 and 0.004, respectively. The parameters are set for
the standard deviation and autocorrelation of consumption-to-output ratio
to be a closer match of the data moments.
Table 2.3: Stochastic processes
Parameter Definition Value Source
ρZ AR(1) coef. of TFP 0.86 Data
σZ Std. dev. of TFP 0.004 Data
ρmS AR(1) coef. of HH borr. LTV ratio 0.9 Data
σmS Std. dev. of HH borr. LTV ratio 0.0003 Data
ρB AR(1) coef. of HC transformation 0.65 Data
σB Std. dev. of HC transformation 0.008 Data
ρεH AR(1) coef. of housing preference 0.8 Data
σεH Std. dev. of housing preference 0.004 Data
2.6 Impulse response analysis and welfare effect
This section provides the impulse responses of the model following the four
shocks: a TFP shock, a shock to households’housing preference, a shock to
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Table 2.4: Business cycle statistics of the key ratios
Model Data
Xi σ̂(Xi) σ̂(Xi)/σ̂(Y ) ρ̂(Xi, Y ) σ̂(Xi) σ̂(Xi)/σ̂(Y ) ρ̂(Xi, Y )
C 0.01 0.83 0.87 0.01 0.77 0.86
LS 0.06 4.78 0.78 0.02 1.64 0.55
W 0.01 0.77 0.72 0.01 1.24 0.81
household-borrowers LTV ratio and a human capital transformation shock.
All shocks are positive and temporary. The graphs present the responses
of the main variables under the presence of a banking competition and hu-
man capital accumulation channel to a one standard deviation shock (see
Appendix B for Figures 2.1-2.4).
Figures 2.1-2.4 about here
2.6.1 TFP shock
When a TFP shock hits the economy, production inputs become more effec-
tive (see Figure 2.1). Following the shock, increasing output requires more
labour and capital inputs. This leads to a raise in investment and households’
wages, allowing households to boost their consumption and investment in
human capital. As a result wages will go up further. As a result, house-
holds spend more time in human capital accumulation than at work. This
growth is also supported by credit availability, leading to enlarged demand for
savers’deposits. Therefore, household-borrowers can purchase more housing
and invest more in human capital. Consequently, the growth of household-
borrowers’wages is greater than it is for household-savers, resulting in tighter
wage gap in the long-run.
2.6.2 Housing preference shock
A housing preference shock leads to an increased housing demand, predom-
inantly by household-borrowers (see Figure 2.2). As per substitution ef-
fect, this lowers their consumption and investment in human capital. Higher
demand for real estate results in greater house prices. To satisfy this de-
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mand, household-borrowers can either supply more labour or borrow more
from banks. Larger labour forces generate higher wages in the short-run.
Household-borrowers also start demanding more loans, increasing the de-
mand for deposits. Savers invest less in long-term human capital, which
decreases their earnings in the long-run. Therefore, this shock creates a
larger wage gap in wage and wealth gaps in the long-run.
2.6.3 Household-borrowers loan-to-value ratio shock
Under a borrowing constraint shock, household-borrowers are able to borrow
more loans (see Figure 2.3). With these loans they bring up their consump-
tion, housing and human capital. Raised demand for loans leads to a greater
credit supply, which increases household-savers’deposits and bank capital.
This shock negatively affects entrepreneurs who are not able to get loans
affecting investment and capital stock in the short-run.
Household-borrowers increase their human capital expenditures, which
rapidly goes up, allowing them to earn greater wage. As savers do not invest
in human capital, wage gap decreases.
2.6.4 Human capital transformation shock
With the presence of this shock, human capital of both households immedi-
ately improves in the long-run (see Figure 2.4). Households realise that the
returns on human capital are higher and will invest more, while spending
less on housing and savings. They spend more time in human capital as a
substitute to working hours. As human capital goes up, they become more
productive, leading to higher wages and increased overall consumption and
output.
On the other hand banks face deposit runs. To keep their liquidity and
solvency, banks increase their capital. Even though the demand for loans
initially drops, it increases in the long-run. This will require more deposits,
which increase as a result of higher interest payments.
Although household-borrowers accumulate higher levels of human capital,
wage gap rises in the long-run, as household-savers always invest more in their
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human capital.
2.6.5 Shocks under the presence of banking competition
Here we present the set of shocks, which are simulated under the presence
of imperfect competition in the banking sector. As we have mentioned in
the previous sections, these shocks are permanent and do not follow AR(I)
process. We increase the value of a banks’adjustment parameter κKB from 5
to 8. We change the steady state value of the deposit elasticity of substitution
εSSBD from −2.2 to −5, and for the steady state values of the two borrowers
loans’elasticity of substitutions from 3.5 to 2.5.
Below we present the changes in the steady states after these permanent
shocks.
Table 2.5: Steady state deviations of various models
Model - Base κKB= 8 εSSBD= −5 εSSBE= εSSBS= 2.5
C
Y
0.77 0.76 0.77 0.81
LE
Y
0.42 0.42 0.42 0.55
LS
Y
0.46 0.46 0.50 0.40
W
Y
0.62 0.62 0.62 0.63
IED
Y
0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
SP 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.60
I
Y
0.09 0.09 0.09 0.12
From Table 2.5 we see that when banks’adjustment parameter and de-
posit elasticity of substitution permanently changes, the steady states of
the main ratios stay constant. However, the ratio of wages-to-output de-
creases, which means, holding output constant, households wages decline
under these shocks. Interestingly, when two borrowers loans’ elasticity of
substitutions become lower, wages-to-output ratio stays as low as under
previous two shocks. However, consumption-to-output ratio, investment-
over-output ratio and entrepreneurs’ loans-over-output ratio increase. On
the other hand, the ratio of household-borrowers’loans-to-output ratio de-
creases. This shock makes entrepreneurs better off, while the two households
are worse off. It is worth mentioning that investment-in-training-to-output
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ratio does not change under these three shocks, which means households do
not invest more in their skills, which can also explain the drop in wages.
2.6.6 Welfare analysis
This section describes the welfare analysis of gains/losses in terms of the
consumption equivalence under the shocks described in the previous section.
We follow the same approach as given in Chapter 1. We assume that each




















































whereW 0i is the welfare before the shock andW
1
i after the shock, and λi is the
gain/loss in terms of the consumption. Substituting this with the logarithmic
utility function given in the model, we get the following expression for the
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Table 2.6 presents the consumption gain/loss for each agent under the
four shocks simulated in the model. The values are expressed in percentage
change. The positive values demonstrate an agent’s gain, while negative
values reveal the agent’s consumption equivalent loss. The table also includes
the values for the skill premium, the ratio of savers’wages over the borrowers’
wages. The discounted percent deviation of the skill premium sheds the light
on the households’wage gap and the rise/decline of the wage gap under each
shock.
Starting with the TFP shock we can see that all agents are better off
under this shock. The wage gap decreases too. This is because more loans
are available to household-borrowers to invest in their human capital. As
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Table 2.6: Welfare and skill premium effects
HH-savers HH-borrowers Entrepr. WH/W S
TFP 0.0069 1.4098 0.1632 -0.0599
B 0.0157 0.0027 -0.0316 0.0068
mS 0.0000 0.0069 -0.0010 -0.0008
εH -0.0019 -0.1299 0.0036 0.5298
households are more productive, the production process is more effi cient as
well.
The consumption responses are positive for both households, indicating
the gain under human capital transformation shock. On the other hand, the
wage gap widens (0.0068%) as a result of savers’transactions of deposits to
human capital, leading to a decrease in loan supply.
The household-borrowers loan-to-value ratio shock makes both house-
holds better off in terms of consumption, while entrepreneurs are worse off.
As a response to this shock the wage gap shrinks at 0.0008% as it allows
household-borrowers’invest more in human capital and housing.
Under the housing preference shock, both households try to purchase
more houses, which negatively affects their wealth in terms of consumption.
Entrepreneurs gain in this case, as the labour supply rises, allowing entrepre-
neurs to increase production. Due to higher labour supply, which is provided
largely by household-borrowers, the wage gap increases at 0.529%.
2.7 Robustness check
2.7.1 Impulse responses and welfare analysis of the various models
In this section we present impulse responses to three shocks in banking side
as a comparison to a base model, which are given in Figures 2.5-2.8 (see
Appendix B). The solid lines in graphs present the base model. Dashed lines
are given for the model with εSSBD=− 5, dotted lines are for εSSBE = εSSBS = 2.5
and finally dotted-dashed lines are for κKB = 8.
Table 2.7 presents the comparison of the results of the base model and
the models with the changed parameters under the four simulated shocks.
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Table 2.7: Robustness checks for the welfare and skill premium effects
HH-savers HH-borrowers Entrepr. WH/W S
TFP 0.0069 1.4098 0.1632 -0.0599
εH -0.0019 -0.1299 0.0036 0.5298
B Base 0.0157 0.0027 -0.0316 0.0068
mS 0.0000 0.0069 -0.0010 -0.0008
TFP 0.0077 1.3358 0.1529 -0.0613
εH -0.0019 -0.1322 0.0032 0.5121
B κKB= 8 0.0158 0.0254 -0.0279 0.0067
mS 0.0000 0.0072 -0.0009 -0.0008
TFP 0.0034 1.4482 0.1591 -0.0569
εH -0.0021 -0.1250 0.0034 0.6211
B εSSBD= −5 0.0172 -0.0420 -0.0358 0.0053
mS 0.0000 0.0089 -0.0009 -0.0008
TFP 0.0092 1.2131 0.1451 -0.0637
εH -0.0017 -0.1454 0.0030 0.4237
B εSSBE= ε
SS
BS= 2.5 0.0126 0.1518 -0.0148 0.0078
mS -0.0000 0.0060 -0.0008 -0.0007
Generally, we can see that household-savers are always better off, just like
in the base model. Moreover, the different modelling assumptions present
that household-borrowers are always worse off than their savers counter-
parts. We see a similar pattern in entrepreneurs as they are also worse off.
Household-borrowers will gain mostly under lower loan elasticity of substitu-
tion, while they will lose more under the lower deposits elasticity of substitu-
tion. Furthermore, with the latter, and under human capital transformation
shock, household-borrowers will lose in terms of consumption while they gain
under the same shock with other modelling assumptions.
The wage gap will always decrease under the TFP and LTV shocks with
three different modelling set-ups. The values are similar across the different
modelling assumptions. However, the wage gap widens under housing pref-
erence and human capital transformation shocks. Overall, the higher capital
adjustment parameter produces lower wage gap across all four shocks.
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2.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we present a model with heterogenous banks that operate
under imperfect competition. This model also includes a human capital ac-
cumulation channel, which allows heterogenous households to endogenously
accumulate human capital and be more productive and competitive in a
labour market. In this research we aim to see how the wealth and wage gaps
changes under the current model set-up and how borrowers and savers change
their decisions under the presence of an imperfect banking competition.
The calibration part of this model is based on a U.S. quarterly data for
the 1965Q1-2016Q4. We match moments produced by the model with the
steady states and the moments of the given dataset.
We find that under the TFP shock households are able to accumulate hu-
man capital, which reduces the wage gap in the short-run. More importantly
this wage gap also decreases in the long-run. Under the housing preference
shock. The output increases in the short-run, but this shock causes larger
wage gap between the two households’wages in the long-run.
Under households LTV ratio shock wage gap decreases in the short-run
only, while it widens in the long-run.
Human capital transformation shock in this model shows that both house-
holds are better off and their wages improve in the long-run. However, it
results in a higher wage gap. It is because of household-savers’higher skills
and, even though household-borrowers invest in human capital, they will not
catch up with the skills of savers.
Permanent change of the parameters on the supply side of the credit
market show that with the imperfect banking competition, wage and wealth
gaps between households increases in the long-run under housing preference
and human capital transformation shocks. These modelling assumptions
also show that household-borrowers are generally worse off than the savers.
Furthermore, under the capital adjustment cost, wage gap reduces across all
four shocks.
Moreover, the robustness check shows that the results of the model stay
robust. However, with higher capital managing costs, household-borrowers
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gain less than other agents, but it also leads to lower deviations of wage gap
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H,t + dH,t + qH,t (HH,t −HH,t−1)












− λSt qH,t + EtβSλSt+1qH,t+1 + µStmS,tqH,t+1 = 0 (B11)
λSt = µ
S
t (1 +RS,t) + EtβSλ
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(1 +RS,t) lS,t = mS,tqH,t+1HS,t (B17)
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Y Wt = WH,tHCH,t−1 (B24)
(1− υ) (1− σ)
NS,t
Y Wt = WS,tHCS,t−1 (B25)
CE,t + qK,t (KE,t − (1− δK)KE,t−1) + (1 +RE,t−1) lE,t−1













(1 +RE,t) lE,t = qK,t+1(1− δK)KE,t (B28)
B.3 Capital producers









εY,t = Xt (εY,t − 1) (B31)
B.5 Banks
B.5.1 Wholesale branch










KB,t = (1− δB)KB,t−1 + jB,t−1 (B33)
Lt = Dt +KB,t (B34)
RBD,t = Rt (B35)
B.5.2 Loan branch




























Lt(j) = LS,t(j) + LE,t(j) (B40)
B.5.3 Deposit branch


















B.6 Aggregate resource constraint
Yt = Ct + qK,t (Kt − (1− δK)Kt−1) + Λ(ut)KE,t−1 + IEDt + δBKB,t−1 (B44)






Ht = HS,t +HH,t = 1 (B47)
B.7 Shocks
log εH,t = (1− ρεH )ε
ss
H + ρεH log εH,t−1 + uH (B48)
logZt = (1− ρZ)Zss + ρZ logZt−1 + uZ (B49)
logBt = (1− ρB)Bss + ρB logBt−1 + uB (B50)





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 3: Role of bank runs on economic
gaps
3.1 Introduction
Wage gap has been increasing over the past years. On average, even high-
skilled workers earn less than they would have before 2007 due to a higher
competition between skilled workers that suppresses their wages. Further-
more, there is a constant decrease in lower-skilled workers’wages, leading
to a rise in skill premium due to demand for more productive workers (see
Acemoglu and Autor, 2012 and Autor, 2014). Higher skills ensure greater
productivity, effi ciency and higher wages for workers. In order to obtain
new skills, workers need to invest and spend time in a skill accumulation
process. Additionally, the accumulation of new skills and, thus, supply of
skilled labour will decrease the skill premium (He, 2012).
The aim of this study is to research how skill premium and supply of
skilled workers are affected by bank destructions, such as bank runs. For
instance, the collapse of U.S. financial institutions during the recent financial
crisis has caused increasing panic, loss of consumer and business confidence,
as well as caused vulnerable financial sectors to steer fast bank runs and the
rough global crisis. From the CPS data, we see that the recent financial
crisis has led to an increased skill premium due to a higher unemployment
rate among low-skilled labour.37
Although there is a rich literature that analyses a banking sector as a
creator and propagator of financial shocks (including bank runs) to the rest of
economy (see, for example, Iacoviello, 2015 and Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2015),
there are limited studies on wage gap and skill premium under bank runs and
possibility of bank shutdowns. This chapter fills this gap by investigating the
impacts of bank failures on the labour market in terms of demand and supply
of skilled and unskilled workers.
Taking into account this limitation of the literature, we present a single
37For further details see The Current Population Survey (CPS) Earnings by Educational
Attainment Table for the period of 1975 to 2016
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DSGE model with bank runs and skill premium that analyses the ability of
workers to choose between different skill levels. It is also unclear how trans-
formation from unskilled to skilled workers and its supply can be affected
by the presence of various financial shocks. This chapter fills this gap by
introducing a new approach in analysing skill premium: i) a banking sector
with possibility of runs or bankruptcies and ii) a skill accumulation channel
to analyse skilled labour supply.
The importance of including both banking sector and skill accumulation
is explained by three main reasons. Firstly, from the recent financial crisis we
see that banks face runs and bankruptcies (see for example, Lehman Brothers
or Northern Rock). The probability of bank bankruptcies will shed light on
severe destructions in deposit and loan markets affecting demand and supply
of skilled and unskilled workers. OECD statistics for the U.S. show that, in
2010, there was less increase in unemployment among high-skilled workers
(at around 5 percentage points), whereas for low-skilled workers it increased
up to 17 percentage points.38
Thus, this leads us to the second point of workers heterogeneity. In this
chapter we present one household, which consists of a banker and two work-
ers, one skilled and one unskilled. We assume that low-skilled workers have
incentives to accumulate skills as a guarantee of greater wages and higher de-
mand for this labour force. Therefore, the inclusion of a skill accumulation
channel permits workers to invest in their skills to improve their productiv-
ity, which positively affects their wages. Furthermore, this inclusion allows
workers to switch between skilled and unskilled groups, which has been im-
possible to implement in the previous two chapters. The presence of banks
and workers heterogeneity will explain what happens to the supply of skilled
and unskilled workers, to their productivity and, most importantly, to their
wages during various shocks. Hence, thirdly, these two channels help us to
study the changes in skill premium under the presence of various shocks.
The skill transformation channel is built on He and Liu (2008). For the
banking sector and possibility of bank runs, we follow the model by Gertler
38Source: OECD World Development Indicators of Skills for Employment in the U.S.
for the period of 1981-2017
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and Karadi (2011) who also replicate shadow banking. These banks do not
have any regulations to follow, they issue short-run debts while holding long-
term securities. This creates a positive environment for the possibility of
bank runs.
Therefore, the set-up of the model in this chapter combines two streams
of literature: skill accumulation and banking bankruptcies. OECD (2015)
research highlights the importance of both investment and time spent in
gaining new skills. Thus, workers in the model are allowed to accumulate
new skills through investing and spending time in a skill gaining process.
Our model shows that under a total factor productivity (TFP) shock, a
shock to skill transformation and a shock to diversion of assets, skill premium
between skilled and unskilled workers’wages reduces. Therefore, we show
that both workers can be better off under the provided assumptions. We
also find that under these shocks the bank capital decreases. Bank capital
is important to investigate under these modelling assumptions as it provides
stability and shock resistance for financial markets. However, higher business
confidence can lead to lower bank capital to increase bank assets.
The shock to the probability of the number of exiting banks increases
skill premium due to higher labour supply by unskilled workers, decreasing
their wages. The bank capital increases under this shock, which indicates
the resistance for instabilities.
Conducted robustness checks are consistent with the benchmark model.
As robustness checks, we compare the benchmark model with three different
models. Model 1 assumes that AS = AU = 1 where workers are indifferent
in accumulating new skills. Model 2 presents a model where both workers
have the same weight in the production function by setting this parameter
to be equal to 0.335. Model 3 presents a model where there is no investment
adjustment cost.
We find that unskilled workers’supply of labour does not drop as much
as it does in the benchmark model, which explains smaller deviation of the
skill premium under these modelling assumptions. However, with υ = 0.335,
the skill premium increases under the skill transformation shock as unskilled
workers’labour supply increases significantly.
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There are two policy implications presented in this chapter. First is the
importance of a skill accumulation channel. Low-skilled workers are better
offwhen they are able to endogenously accumulate new skills, which reduces
wage gap in the long-run and provides financial wellness among workers.
Secondly, under the model provided in this study, the bank capital decreases
under most shocks. Therefore, with a greater supply of high-skilled workers
in the economy, the bank capital is lower, which presents financial confidence.
The rest of the chapter is as follows: Section 3.2 provides the litera-
ture review in banking and skill premium. Section 3.3 presents the DSGE
model with a banking sector and the presence of a skill accumulation chan-
nel. Section 3.4 provides decentralised competitive equilibrium (DCE). The
calibration of our model is given in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 provides the dis-
cussion of empirical results, and Section 3.7 describes the robustness checks.
Finally, the conclusion can be found in Section 3.8.
3.2 Related literature
There is a vast amount of literature on financial instability, bank runs and
bankruptcies that can severely damage the economic situation of a coun-
try. Even strong banks with stable profits and good management are unsafe
against bank runs if agents believe these banks will collapse. However, there
is limited literature investigating the effects of instability in a banking sec-
tor on skill premium and supply and demand for workers with different skill
levels.
There is also literature on skill premium and skill accumulation, which
is rich and fruitful. Accumulation of new skills is important as it affects
supply and demand for workers. High-skilled workers are in greater demand
by employers compared to their lower-skilled counterparts (see, for example,
Acemoglu, 1998, 2002, Mankiw, 2000, and Goldin and Katz, 2008).
These papers also suggest that workers who are able to advance their skills
and develop additional productivity also improve their financial wellbeing by
earning higher wages. The recent papers find that a greater labour force
with higher skills leads to economic prosperity. For example, Acemoglu et al.
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(2014) propose that better skills and productivity jointly create a positive
environment for long-term economic growth and development. Higher wages
allow workers to increase consumption expenditures, thus, increasing the
demand for goods and services, which also supports development in financial
sectors and economic growth.
Murphy and Topel (2016) state that a decline in skill investment can
cause higher wage gap growth, which leads to losses in the banking sector
and negative economic outcomes. They indicate that to affect wage gap,
implementing policies should support larger investment in skill accumulation
to increase the supply of skilled workers. Furthermore, bank runs do not
significantly affect skilled workers, while unskilled workers are at a higher
risk of losing their jobs or working less hours and earning lower wages.
Thus, we examine the other stream of literature that looks at bank runs
and instability in financial sectors.
The literature covering bank runs before the global financial crisis state
that bank runs might occur even with a low probability of default (see Zhu,
2005). It can arise when agents genuinely need their deposits back. Require-
ments, such as a reserve rate and deposit insurance, are effi cient in preventing
runs. However, these requirements might force banks to invest ineffi ciently
and create asymmetric information in credit markets. Ennis and Keister
(2006) show that when banks invest more, economic growth also increases,
however, with less investment, banks have more resources in case of runs.
These two outcomes depend on the probability or expectation of runs.
Asymmetric information can arise when deposit holders are not aware of
banks’risky activities, which might cause illiquidity of assets and bank runs.
For example, before the recent financial crisis, banks used asset-backed securi-
ties or created CDOs (see Calvo, 2009). Chen and Hasan (2008) demonstrate
that runs happen when depositors expect information that reveals instability
or signals banks’risky activities. Furthermore, they demonstrate that with
full and clear information agents might panic, causing runs even when agents
are rational.
Bernanke (2010) explains this as follows: withdrawing is an easier way to
deal with the information individuals hold rather than analysing the safety
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of their funds in bank deposits. The uncertainty also comes from the shadow
banking, which, prior to the recent financial crisis, was not regulated, leaving
investment under high risk. Moreover, most financial institutions have relied
on short-term funding when they started selling assets at a fire price. This
made short-term funding costly and hard to obtain, causing lower credit sup-
ply, more runs and further instability in the financial sector. As Bernanke
(2010) states, defaulting subprime mortgages wouldn’t damage the U.S. econ-
omy as much as bank runs did.
For instance, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) also find that depositors might
assume a bank is planning to default if the bank has stopped issuing loans
to the public, which usually happens during recessions. Thus, most recent
papers look at both micro- and macroeconomic levels to understand the
behaviour of individuals and firms on the aggregate economy. Combining two
levels helps to link consequences of financial accelerator and bank liquidity
at individual and aggregate levels.
Gertler et al. (2016, 2017) further research bank runs. In particular, they
emphasise their attention on wholesale banks and their role in the financial
crisis as wholesale banks were severely affected during the crisis. Wholesale
banks financed themselves with short-term debts through interbank markets
by lending and borrowing from/to other banks. Retail banks, on the other
hand, relied on funds from households. Authors also find that wholesale
banks generally lead to higher productivity and economic growth, however,
expansion of this sector results in a weaker economic resistance to changes.
3.3 Model
3.3.1 Households
Households are presented as persistent supply of workers with a unit measure.
Households save, consume and supply labour force. Each household consists
of workers and bankers. Bankers are intermediaries who pay any profit they
earn back into households they come from. Thus, banks are owned by house-
holds, however, savings that households hold are not in the same bank they
own. At each period of time, workers are either skilled or unskilled. Unskilled
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workers are able to become skilled through the skill transformation channel,
which is built on He and Liu (2008).
Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), we assume that the fraction of
households are workers (1 − f) with the rest f being bankers. The prob-
ability for bankers to stay in a banking sector is σ while the survival time
for any banker is 1
(1−σ) on average. Therefore, (1 − σ)f of bankers leave
the banking sector and become workers, while a similar number of workers
become bankers, keeping the fraction of each group constant. Each house-
hold funds the start-up of a banker from that household. The representative
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where βi ∈ (0, 1) is the household’s discount factor. Ct represents the house-
hold’s consumption and a is a consumption habit coeffi cient. Disutility of
labour is given by fraction of St skilled and Ut unskilled workers with a ϕ
labour supply elasticity and γ weight given to the disutility of labour.
The representative household is subject to the following budget con-
straint:
Ct + IH,t +Bt+1 = Πt +RtBt +WS,tSt +WU,t(1− et)Ut (68)
where IH,t is an investment in skill accumulation. Households purchase Bt+1
short-term debt, which pays gross real return of Rt. Short-term debt can
be deposits or government bonds, which are perfectly substitutable. Skilled
households are paid WS,t, whereas unskilled households WU,t. et shows the
time unskilled workers invest in the skill accumulation process. Πt is a net
start-up fund provided to a banker by a household.
Households are subject to the skill accumulation channel, which allows
unskilled worker to become skilled by investing goods and time:







where η is a depreciation rate of current skills, Skillt is a shock to effi cient
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skill transformation process, α shows the importance of goods input relative
to time inputs, χ is the return to scale.
3.3.2 Firms
Production side of the model is presented by firms who produce final goods.
Their production process follows Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt = At (utKt)
θ (ASSt)υ (AUUt(1− et))(1−θ−υ) (70)
where Yt is the output produced by firms and At is a TFP shock. Firms
hire workers according to their current skills. υ shows the weight of skilled
workers’input in the production process. As skilled and unskilled workers’
weight in the production process are supplements, households are indifferent
in terms of their skill accumulation. Therefore, to get exogenous productivity
and exogenous skill premium, we introduce AS and AU . Kt is capital stock
whereas θ shows the importance of capital stock input in the production
process. To buy capital stock firms use intermediaries service. Firms issue
Ast claims to buy Kt+1 capital stock at a price of Qt. Therefore,
QtAst = QtKt+1 (71)
3.3.3 Capital producers
Capital producers buy capital stock from firms at the end of the time t,
renovate it and form new capital. They sell this new repaired capital at
price of Qt. We also assume that capital producers face adjustment costs
while producing new capital. We assume that households, owners of capital
producers, receive profit from this production. The discounted return for




βT−tΛt,τ {(Qτ − 1)It − f (Iτ − Iss) Iτ} (72)
where
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Kt+1 = (1− δ(ut))Kt − It (73)
and δ(ut) is given as in Christiano et al. (2005):





where δ(ut)Kt presents the quantity of capital that has been renovated.
3.3.4 Banks
Here we present a banking sector, which is built on Gertler and Karadi (2011).
Banks are the financial intermediaries that transfer funds from households
to firms. Their assets are long-term, while liabilities are short-term.
The balance sheet of a j bank takes the form of:
QtAsjt = Njt +Bjt+1 (75)
where Asjt are financial claims on firms in the production side. Njt is the
net worth a j bank has. Alternatively, we can assume that Njt is the bank’s
equity capital. Bjt+1 are households deposits in banks, for which banks pay
Rt+1 real gross return at time t + 1. Asjt are assets that are paid RK,t+1
return.
The bank’s equity capital changes over time according to the following
process, which comes from the difference between returns on assets and in-
terest payments on liabilities:
Njt+1 = RK,t+1QtAsjt −Rt+1Bjt+1 (76)
= (RK,t+1 −Rt+1)QtAsjt +Rt+1Njt (77)
Higher returns on assets depend on interest rate premium (RK,t+1 −Rt+1)
and the total amount of assets QtAsjt.
Financial intermediaries are subject to inequality constraint:
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EtβiΛt,t+1+i (RK,t+1+i −Rt+1+i) ≥ 0 (78)
where i ≥ 0. The inequality constraint shows that assets with discounted
return are not funded if their return is less than the discounted cost of borrow-
ing. Moreover, in perfect markets the risk premium equals to zero, making
the above equation hold with equality. The premium, however, is positive
under imperfect markets.
Therefore, as long as banks can at least earn zero return from their activ-















As σ shows the probability of bankers staying bankers and not becoming
workers, we introduce a shock to this probability. Thus, this shock affects
the fraction of surviving banks in the market.
We assume that as long as βi+1Λt,t+1+i (RK,t+1+i −Rt+1+i) is positive,
banks will demand more funds from households to enlarge their assets. How-
ever, this operation is costly for banks and it raises the moral hazard problem.
For instance, banks can choose to transfer λ portion of project funds back
to the household they come from. In this case, depositors can enforce banks
to bankrupt and recover (1− λ) of the project funds, but it is too costly to
recover λ funds.
Therefore, for depositors to keep providing funds to banks, the following
constraint should satisfy:
Vjt ≥ (λ ∗Dvrtt)QtAsjt (80)
where Vjt shows the loss if bankers transfer a fraction of assets whereas
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λQtAsjt is the gain from diverting funds. We also introduce here a shock
Dvrtt that increases the possibility of a larger diversion, leading to bank runs
and bank bankruptcies.
Alternatively, we can present Vjt as:
















is the assets’gross growth rate. Zt+1+i =
Njt+i
Njt
is the net worth’s gross growth rate. νt is an expected discounted marginal
gain if a bank increases its asset holdings by one unit while its net worth is
constant. The larger νt, the greater is the opportunity cost to the banker from
being forced into bankruptcy. ηt is an expected discounted value of additional
net worth while assets are fixed. Under the presence of competition in a
capital market with no presence of frictions, banks will be borrowing until
rates of return change so that νt equals to zero. To avoid this, banks are also
subject to the incentive constraint:
ηtNjt + νtQtAsjt ≥ (λ ∗Dvrtt)QtAsjt (84)
Whenever this constraint is binding then the amount of assets banks can
have will depend on banks equity:




where Φt is a leverage ratio. Higher Asjt will lead banks to be willing to
divert the fraction of λ while holding Njt constant.
If νt > 0 then banks will increase their assets as it is more profitable.
Banks’net worth is then given by the following equation:
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Thus, we can derive total demand for assets as:
QtAst = ΦtNt (89)
where Nt is the bank’s aggregate capital. The net worth of banks comes from
the net worth of existing banks Net and of those who enter industry Nnt.
Nt = Net +Nnt (90)
where
Net = (σ ∗ Extt) [(RK,t −Rt)Φt−1 +Rt]Nt−1 (91)




is the fraction of (1 − σ)QtAst−1 transferred from households to new
banks.
Replacing Equations 91 and 92 in 90 gives the following:
Nt = Net +Nnt = (σ ∗ Extt) [(RK,t −Rt)Φt−1 +Rt]Nt−1 + ωQtAst−1 (93)
3.3.5 Aggregate resource constraint
Yt = Ct + It + IH,t + f (Iτ − Iss) Iτ (94)
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3.3.6 Shocks
This section presents four shocks in the model: a TFP shock, a shock to
skill accumulation channel, a shock to diversion of funds, and a shock to the
probability of exiting banks.
log TFPt = ρTFP log TFPt−1 + uTFP (95)
logSkillt = ρSK logSkillt−1 + uSK (96)
logDvrtt = ρD logDvrtt−1 + uD (97)
logExtt = ρE logExtt−1 + uE (98)
3.4 Decentralised competitive equilibrium
The non-stochastic decentralised competitive equilibrium (DCE) is summarised
by a sequence of allocations {Ct, Kt, St, Ut, et, IH,t, ut, Bt, Ast, It, Yt, νt,
Λt,t+1, Xt, ηt, Zt, Φt, Nt, }∞t=0 and prices {WS,t, WU,t, RK,t, Rt, Qt}∞t=0 such
that the two types of workers solve their optimisation problem, and firms,
capital producers and banks maximise their profits, taking prices and initial
conditions for capital stock as given; and all the markets clear (see Appendix
C)
3.5 Calibration
We calibrate the parameters of the model by following Gertler and Karadi
(2011), He and Liu (2008), Jones et al. (1993) and Christiano et al. (2005),
which is presented in Table 3.1.
We also set AS and AU to 1.45 and 1 to get a skill premium of 1.6.
Stochastic processes We set parameters for autocorrelation and standard
deviations for TFP and skill transformation shocks following the values given
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Table 3.1: Calibration
Parameter Definition Value Source
β HH discount factor 0.99 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
a HH consumption habit coeffi cient 0.815 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
ϕ Elasticity of labour supply 0.276 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
γ Weight of labour disutility 1 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
η Skill depreciation rate 0.1 Jones et al. (1993)
α Goods share in the skill process 0.4 He and Liu (2008)
χ Returns to scale in skill process 0.75 He and Liu (2008)
δK Capital depreciation rate 0.025 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
ξU Marginal depreciation elasticity wrt ut 7.2 Christiano et al. (2005)
θ Weight of capital stock input 0.33 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
υ Weight of skilled workers’input 0.4 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
bU Weight of utilisation rate 0.0376 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
ISS Steady state investment 0.3387 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
φi Inverse elasticity of investment 1.728 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
σ Bank’s survival rate 0.972 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
λ Fraction of funds diverted by a banker 0.381 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
ω Proportional transfer to entering bank 0.02 Gertler & Karadi (2011)
in the Gertler and Karadi (2011) and He and Liu (2008) papers, respectively.
Unlike in Gertler and Karadi (2011), we present a positive TFP shock. We
use standard values for the parameters of the autocorrelation and the stan-
dard deviation of the two financial shocks as there is no literature to base
them on. Therefore, we look at the main variables, their reactions, and the
directions of the changes while considering these two shocks. The parameters
of the autocorrelation and the standard deviation of the AR(I) processes are
given in Table 3.2:
3.6 Impulse response analysis
This section describes the impulse response functions after the four shocks:
a TFP shock, a shock to skill transformation, a shock to diversion of funds,
and a shock to the probability of the number of exiting banks (see Appendix
C).
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Table 3.2: Stochastic processes
Parameter Definition Value
ρTFP AR(1) coef. of TFP 0.95
σTFP Std. dev. of TFP 0.01
ρSK AR(1) coef. of HH skill transformation 0.85
σSK Std. dev. of HH skill transformation 0.01
ρD AR(1) coef. of diversion of funds 0.85
σD Std. dev. of diversion of funds 0.01
ρE AR(1) coef. of probability of number of exiting banks 0.85
σE Std. dev. of probability of number of exiting banks 0.01
Figures 3.1-3.4 about here
3.6.1 TFP shock
We start analysing IRs with a positive TFP shock presented in Figure 3.1.
Under this shock, output increases immediately, while production inputs be-
come more effi cient. Capital producers using the increased productivity will
start investing more in capital, leading to a higher supply of capital. How-
ever, the demand for the capital starts rising as capital prices decline, leading
to an increased demand for loans. Moreover, we see that risk premium drops
as a result of higher deposits and initial lower demand for loans. Skilled work-
ers’wages increase slightly. Unlike skilled workers, unskilled workers supply
less labour that raises their wages, which decreases skill premium. Moreover,
workers deposit more, which explains a decline in the bank capital.
3.6.2 Shock to skill transformation
Here we present a shock to a skill transformation channel and its effects
on real variables (see Figure 3.2). This shock improves the productivity of
all workers, which leads to a larger supply of skilled workers. Due to this
increase in supply of skilled workers, their wages drop significantly compared
to the wages of unskilled workers. As workers do not generally earn much,
the deposits drop too. To ensure the increase in deposits, banks will increase
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the interest rates on deposits, which explains the drop in risk premium.
However, we also see a drop in the bank capital due to a significant decline
in risk premium, which also negatively affects the production in the economy.
However, as the productivity of workers increase, firms start producing more
output and claim more loans to purchase capital, which explains the rise in
the bank capital the following quarters.
Consequently, we see that skill premium drops as skilled workers’wages
drop. This is the opposite result to those under solvent banks, where skill
premium increases under a similar shock to the human capital transformation
shock.
3.6.3 Shock to diversion of funds
In this subsection, we present IRs after a positive shock that affects the frac-
tion of total assets which a banker decides to divert back to the household
they originally came from (see Figure 3.3). The diversion of a fraction of as-
sets can lead to bank runs, and depositors might force bankers to bankrupt.
We see that the positive diversion shock leads to lower bank capital and its
net worth through decreased risk premium. The optimal leverage ratio has
to decline after periods, following this shock, to eliminate any incentives for a
banker to divert funds in the future and balance the cost of doing so. Lower
bank capital explains the decrease of loans to firms, which drops production.
To increase the production, firms require more capital and labour. More-
over, households’ consumption decreases overall due to fewer bonuses and
dividends paid by banks in terms of λ.
However, the wages increase only for unskilled workers, as their labour
supply drops, leading to a significant decrease in skill premium.
3.6.4 Shock to the probability of the number of exiting banks
Finally, there is a positive shock to the probability of the number of bankers
exiting the market in the next period (see Figure 3.4). Under this shock,
we assume that σ becomes lower, because the probability of bankers to stay
in the financial market is higher, leading to stability and confidence in this
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market. Banking capital increases as deposits decrease due to lower wages.
Risk premium increases as bankers don’t require deposits, but have high
demand for loans. As a result, output goes up, which induces a greater
supply of workers, mainly low-skilled labour. Therefore, as the supply of
unskilled workers increases their wages go down, while it is the opposite for
skilled labour, though their wages do not increase significantly. Consequently,
we see that skill premium increases.
3.7 Robustness check
This section presents robustness checks, which analyse different modelling
assumptions: i) we assume that workers are indifferent in accumulating new
skills by assuming that AS = AU = 1. We use AS and AU to get the skill
premium value of 1.6. However, when we assume that AS = AU = 1 then skill
premium is calculated based on skills workers already have, and will equal to
1.1 in the steady state. Workers are still able to change their skills but they
will be indifferent in doing so. However, as AS is lower, we expect output and
investment to be lower than in the benchmark model; ii) next we introduce a
model where both workers have the same weight in the production function
by setting υ = 0.335. In the benchmark model we assumed that skilled
workers have a higher weight and importance in the production process than
unskilled workers. Here, as in the previous model, we assume that output
will be affected in this model as unskilled workers, who are less productive,
are as important as skilled workers; iii) and finally, we analyse the model
where investment adjustment parameter φi = 0. Here we are simplifying the
model to have a standard law of motion equation. As there is no adjustment
cost affecting investment, then investment and capital are higher than they
are in the benchmark model.
Figures 3.5-3.8 present the IRs under each shock for the three modelling
assumptions. The solid lines are for the benchmark model. The dashed lines
present Model 1 where AS = AU = 1. The dotted lines are for Model 2 where
υ = 0.335. Lastly, the dashed-dotted lines are for Model 3, which is without
investment adjustment costs (φi = 0).
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Figures 3.5-3.8 about here
We start our interpretation of IRs with a TFP shock (see Figure 3.5).
Under AS = AU = 1, skilled and unskilled workers earn similar wages, which
is slightly higher for skilled workers. As workers do not change their skills,
the demand for capital is higher under this model. While there is a higher
demand for loans and a greater supply of deposits, the optimal leverage
ratio will decrease. Model 3 presents the highest raise in investment and
output due to exclusion of the investment adjustment costs. With the higher
wages of unskilled labour in each model, the skill premium will be decreasing.
However, in Model 1, both workers’wages are similar, which explains that
there is no change in skill premium under AS = AU = 1.
Figure 3.6 presents IRs after a skill accumulation shock. When workers
have the same weight in the production function (υ = 0.335), the supply of
labour increases, which decreases in other modelling assumptions, leading to
a rise in output. That makes firms demand more loans to purchase capital.
Risk premium increases as there is no great need in attracting loanable funds
from depositors. As the supply of unskilled workers increase their wages
drop, which results in the skill premium going up. It is interesting that
under this shock the bank capital decreases in the base model and under
φi = 0, however, it increases under υ = 0.335 and A
S = AU = 1. Overall,
skill premium declines under this shock across the rest of the models, which
increased in the first two chapters under a similar shock to skills.
Next, we present IRs after the shock to the diversion of assets by banks,
shown in Figure 3.7. As mentioned previously, this shock leads to a lower
fraction of diverted funds by banks to the households they came from. It is
interesting that under AS = AU = 1 real variables deviate less than in the
benchmark model, with investment and output increasing slightly due to the
lowerAS, and workers productivity staying almost unchanged. We see similar
results in Model 2 with υ = 0.335 for each type of workers. Investment and
output are lower than in the benchmark model because unskilled workers
are as important as skilled workers in the production. Even though their
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productivity is lower than that of skilled workers, leading to lower output.
In Model 3, the output and investment increase due to φi = 0. Moreover, in
all three models, unskilled workers supply less labour, which leads to higher
wages for these agents and, thus, a fall in skill premium.
Finally, we discuss IRs after a shock to the probability of the number of
exiting banks under the three modelling assumptions (see Figure 3.8). This
shock increases the possibility of individuals to stay as bankers in the next
period. Model 1 shows that due to the nature of the shock, loan demand
decreases as lower σ affects bank capital and the availability of loans un-
der AS = AU = 1. Moreover, under this assumption, workers will be less
productive but provide more labour, which drops wages, thus, creating less
deposits. Taking this into account, we see that output doesn’t deviate much
from its steady state under Model 1. Model 2 shows similar results because
less productive workers have the same weight in the production, which paired
with a lower demand for loans, leads to slight increase in output, compared to
Model 3 and the base model. The skill premium is increasing under these two
models, as skilled workers earn slightly more wages, while unskilled labour’s
wages fall. Model 3, on the other hand, shows that under this shock, and
with φi = 0, output increases due to higher investment and a greater de-
mand for loans. However, skill premium in this model increases, similar to
the previous two models, due to lower wages of unskilled workers.
Overall, the three models and the benchmark model show that skill pre-
mium generally decreases under all shocks, apart from the shock to the prob-
ability of the number of exiting banks, which leads to a rise in skill premium
under different modelling assumptions, including the base model.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we present a DSGE model with skilled and unskilled workers
in one household. These workers can switch between the two groups, thus,
becoming more or less skilled. The banking sector represents the sector
in which banks can bankrupt and experience bank runs. However, in this
chapter we assume two financial shocks that show stability in the sector,
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which is at the opposite to the financial instability caused by bank runs.
The latter allows us to investigate the changes in skill premium under various
shocks, and workers’decision on skill accumulation.
Our findings show that under the TFP shock, unskilled workers supply
less labour that increases their wages. Skilled workers, on the other hand,
supply more labour, leading to lower wages. This, in turn, shrinks the skill
premium. This result is consistent with the findings of the first two chapters
under the same shock. Under the shock to the transformation of skills, the
skill premium decreases following the drop in skilled workers’wages. It is
interesting as under solvent banks and a competition in the banking sector,
that was presented in the previous chapters, the skill premium increases
under the similar shock. We find that under the shock to diversion funds
by bankers, skill premium drops as the wages rise only for unskilled workers
following the decline in their labour supply. The skill premium increases
under the shock to the probability of the number of exiting banks. This
shock represents the stability of the financial market, leading to higher output
production. This rise induces higher labour supply by unskilled workers,
leading to lower wages for these agents.
Furthermore, the robustness check shows that the findings stay robust
under different modelling assumptions. However, as we assume φi = 0, in-













λt = Etβλt+1Rt (C2)
−βγ (St + Ut+1)ϕ + Etβλt+1WS,t+1 + SKt − EtβSKt+1 (1− η) (C3)



































































Yt = At (utKt)
θ (ASSt)υ (AUUt(1− et))(1−θ−υ) (C13)
QtAst = QtKt (C14)
C.3 Capital producers















(1− σ ∗ Extt+1)βΛt,t+1 (RK,t+1 −Rt) +


















QtAst = ΦtNt (C22)
Nt = (σ ∗ Extt) [(RK,t −Rt−1)Φt−1 +Rt−1]Nt−1 + ωQtAst−1 (C23)
C.5 Aggregate resource constraint









log TFPt = ρTFP log TFPt−1 + uTFP (C25)
logSkillt = ρSK logSkillt−1 + uSK (C26)
logDvrtt = ρD logDvrtt−1 + uD (C27)






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This thesis fills the gap in the literature by analysing the effects of various
banking sectors and financial shocks they generate on wage and wealth gaps
and the supply of skilled labour. There are studies that have attempted to in-
vestigate the wealth redistribution across households under the policies that
change interest rates in the economy (see, for example, Alpanda and Zubairy,
2016). However, these studies do not empirically analyse the effects of finan-
cial and productivity shocks on wage and wealth gaps between heterogeneous
households with the presence of different types of banking sectors.
Each chapter introduces a DSGE model with a banking sector and a
channel that allows households to invest in their skills in order to become
more productive and earn higher wages. The significance of these studies to
policymakers is that it shows the vital role of skill accumulation in decreas-
ing wage gap. As the reviewed literature in human capital show, wage gap
is unavoidable. However, it is possible to create an environment in which
unskilled workers are able to accumulate new skills that will lower the wage
gap. Therefore, it is important to introduce policies that will allow workers
to attend various on- and off-job training to gain essential skills.
For example, Chapter 1 shows that with the presence of the solvent bank-
ing sector, wage gap can be significantly reduced under the TFP shock, which
has positive long-run effects. The preferences and financial shocks create
higher wage gap both in terms of welfare and wage rates. Human capital
productivity shock leads to lower welfare gap, which will be reduced both
in the short-run and in the long-run. Furthermore, a lower capital-asset re-
quirement ratio leads to higher wage and consumption gaps in the long-run.
We also find that the presence of banks considerably mitigates the effects of
financial shocks on wage gap.
Chapter 2 finds that with the imperfect banking competition the TFP
shock shrinks the wage and wealth gaps, whereas the housing preference
and financial shocks lead to higher wage gap in terms of households’welfare
and wage rates in the long-run. Similar to Chapter 1, under the shock to
human capital accumulation, welfare is reduced both in the long and short-
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run, however, wage gap widens in the long-run. Moreover, higher capital
managing costs lead to lower deviations of skill premium.
Chapter 3 presents a model with a skill accumulation channel and in-
solvent banking sector. Findings show that under the TFP shock the wage
gap shrinks, as it is the case in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. However, under
the skill accumulation shock the wage gap decreases, which contrasts to the
findings in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. We also find that under the diversion
funds shock the wage gap decreases, while it widens under the probability of
the number of exiting banks. The latter shock produces interesting results
as it show the stability in the banking sector, which leads to lower wages for
unskilled workers creating higher wage gap.
For further research, it would be interesting to study wage gap under the
presence of monetary and fiscal policies. For example, Gertler and Karadi
(2011) present a model with a credit policy, where a central bank can in-
ject funds into the economy during crises or provide funds as a "lender of
last resort". This injection could replicate the quantitative easing policies
that have been implemented during the recent crisis. Fiscal policies can also
help to analyse wage gap as it can, for instance, affect the disposable or
"take home" income, which will reduce the funds to invest in human capital.
Moreover, it would be worthwhile conducting a crisis experiment in a similar
way to Gertler and Karadi (2011). It is also worth assuming the lower bound
interest rate and how this will affect wage gap. Furthermore, the type of pro-
duction function proposed by Krusell et al. (2000) may also be considered.
It is assumed that this production function matches skill premium data bet-
ter than the Cobb-Douglas production function we have used in this thesis.
This would allow researches to compare the results under the two production
functions to also match other variables in the models. In addition, it could
be worthwhile to conduct a historical decomposition of the three models,
similar to the one in the Iacoviello (2015) paper.
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